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ABSTRACT 
 Despite a nationwide presence, the daily provision of toxicologic emergency care 
and collaboration within the public health and emergency management arena, the nation’s 
poison centers are underutilized as a resource and as a partner for homeland security. The 
lack of utilization has clinical and monetary implications across the healthcare and public 
health enterprise. This thesis investigated the question do poison centers improve 
outcomes during public health emergencies? If so, how can they be better leveraged? 
This thesis research includes a case study analysis evaluating five functions that poison 
centers provide: disaster response, situational awareness around emerging threats, 
communication of these threats to the general public and to health care responders, 
clinical expertise and reducing the burden on health care facilities by preventing 
unnecessary emergency department visits, and reducing hospitalized patient’s length of 
stay. The findings of this research demonstrate that poison centers do positively impact 
outcomes during a disaster. They save lives, reduce health care costs, and provide a 
unique and valuable resource to the public and professional community. In order to better 
leverage these capabilities recommendations based on this research, collaboration should 
be increased with the Department of Homeland Security, Health Resources and Service 
Administration, and the Center for Disease Control, as well as with local and state 
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 Despite a nationwide presence, the daily provision of toxicologic emergency care, 
collaboration within the public health and emergency management arena, and significant 
contributions to health care that have spanned more than 50 years, the nation’s poison 
centers are underutilized as a resource and as a partner for homeland security. The lack of 
utilization has clinical and monetary implications across the healthcare and public health 
enterprise. This thesis investigates whether poison centers improve outcomes during 
public health emergencies, and if so, how they can be better leveraged. 
From the literature search conducted, case studies and research were evaluated, 
and they demonstrated both effectiveness of poison center utilization during emergencies 
and inherent limitations. Knowledge of poison center’s function, scope of services, and 
clinical expertise is not widely known within the homeland security expertise. Cases 
studies and examples that demonstrate these capabilities were analyzed. 
Although individual poison centers vary somewhat in their capabilities, this 
analysis considered all poison centers in the country collectively. Poison centers not only 
have a shared mission but each of the 55 recognized poison centers work collaboratively 
and are aligned through their membership organization: the American Association of 
Poison Control Centers (AAPCC). Poison centers also attain accreditation through the 
AAPCC and as such must meet an accreditation criterion that is standardized across all 
centers.  
The analysis for this thesis is centered on five of the core functions that poison 
centers provide nationwide: (1) disaster response efforts; (2) the provision of situational 
awareness around emerging threats; (3) communication of these threats to the general 
public and to health care responders; (4) provision of clinical toxicologic expertise; and 
(5) reduction of resource burdens on health care facilities by preventing unnecessary 
emergency department visits and reducing hospitalized patient’s length of stay.  
The results demonstrated benefits to using a poison center during an emergency. 
These benefits include: (1) faster response time in the identification of a toxin; (2) 
 xvi 
development of a treatment plan; and (3) dissemination of critical information to the 
general public and all public and health care responders. Poison centers’ efforts help to 
prevent emergency departments being overwhelmed with patients by providing clinical 
triage and health information over the phone. In addition, the research shows case studies 
in which early identification of an emerging trend was detected by poison center staff and 
responders were able to initiate efforts towards containment because of their 
toxicosurveillance capabilities.  
The results of this analysis suggest that to contribute more effectively to disaster 
response, poison centers must promote what they have done and can do in a disaster. The 
AAPCC and individual centers themselves need to partner with relevant homeland 
security and other officials to develop a strategic plan to fully utilize poison centers’ 
capabilities in public emergencies. These strategies should include: (1) the expansion of 
collaborations with nontraditional partners, including those outside of healthcare; (2) the 
provision of surveillance around all chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
explosives (CBRN) threats; and (3) the active engagement in disaster response and 
planning efforts.  
For there to be an impactful change as to how poison centers’ capabilities are 
integrated into disaster response efforts on a local, state and national levels during a 
disaster, these strategizes need to be adopted by all poison centers within the AAPCC 
membership. To implement these strategies, specific tactics will be required at the local, 
state, and national levels. These tactics should include enhancing their local and state 
presence by: (1) allowing centers to have access to health care facilities’ electronic 
medical records, and (2) the participation in local and state disaster drills. 
On a national level the tactics should include: (1) maintaining centers’ existing 
relationship with Health Resources and Services Administration; (2) the ongoing 
promotion of the national Poison Helpline’s public awareness campaign to include target 
audiences, such as law enforcement, emergency medical services, and public health 
professionals; (3) build on the current relationship with the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) around toxicosurveillance to include surveillance and support not just with 
 xvii 
pandemic flu and Ebola but other public health concerns; and (4) develop a more formal 
and collaborative relationship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
more specifically with the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA).  
Our nation is confronted by threats that are either manmade or naturally occurring 
on a daily basis. Vigilance is needed to plan for, detect, respond to, and mitigate the 
effects of these threats. Poison centers do this on a daily basis. It is in the best interest of 
our communities to leverage the demonstrated expertise of our poison centers in order to 
enhance existing disaster response efforts. We need to do this is order to better safeguard 
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Despite a nationwide presence, the daily provision of toxicologic emergency care, 
and some collaboration within the public health and emergency management arena, the 
nation’s poison centers are underutilized as a resource and as a partner for homeland 
security. A poison center’s overall function according to the World Health Organization 
(WHO) is to “prevent, identify and provide management guidelines on poisonings” either 
through phone consultation, treatment centers, or laboratory services.1 The research 
presented in this thesis focuses on the implications of not fully engaging poison centers 
during a disaster and the resulting clinical and monetary implications across the 
healthcare and public health enterprise. 
During the course of the last 50 plus years, countries throughout the world have 
established poison control centers in response to the growing public health concern about 
poisonings.2 The World Health Organization reported that over four percent of the 
world’s deaths were due to poisonings.3 These deaths are due in part from exposures to 
pesticides, chemicals, and radioactive material from nuclear power plants. These 
chemical incidents are the results of manmade errors, acts of terrorism, mechanical 
malfunctions, and natural disasters. In the United States, poisonings account for the 
majority of the injury related deaths that occur. In this country, these deaths are largely 
attributed to the ingestion of prescription, over the counter, or illegal drugs.4 The 
American Association of Poison Control Centers 2013 annual report states poison centers 
                                                 
1“International Programme on Chemical Safety-Poisons Centres,” World Health Organizations, 
accessed June 8, 2015 http://www.who.int/ipcs/poisons/centre/en/.  
2 Ali Pourmand, Justin Wang, and Maryann Mazer, “A Survey of Poison Control Centers Worldwide,” 
DARU Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences 20 (2012): 1, DOI: 10.1186/2008-2231-20-13. 
3 “International Programme on Chemical Safety-Poisons Centres,” World Health Organizations.  
4 “NCHS Data on Drug Poisoning Deaths,” Center for Disease Control, June 2015, accessed 
November 5, 2015, www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/factsheets/fact_drug_poisoning.pdf.  
2 
provided management recommendations for over two million poisonings, of which 1500 
patients died.5  
Poison centers may vary in the services that they provide, how they are staffed, 
and in their funding methods, but they do have the unifying mission of reducing the cost, 
severity, and morbidity associated with poisonings.6 They also have the shared 
responsibility of playing a key public health role within their communities. One aspect of 
this role is that of toxicosurveillance or toxicovigilance. This is the early identification of 
emerging threats to a city, state, or country. Tangential to this role is that of providing 
evidence based management guidelines in response to these threats to health care 
providers and responders.7 These threats may be natural or manmade. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
We are living in a time when public expectations are that health care, public 
health, and government agencies will respond quickly and with expertise during a crisis. 
Posion centers have a long history of providing clinical expertise during emergencies. 
They are, however, often times overlooked or engaged late in the course of a diasster. 
Their toxicosurviellance efforts provide for early recognition of biological, chemical or 
radioactive threats,8 such as with Ebola, influenza, carbon monoxide exposures after 
Hurricane Sandy or countless other examples.9 This early recognition sets the stage for a 
quick response and deployment of assistance and resources as well as better public health 
and community outcomes. 
                                                 
5 James B. Mowry et al., “AAPCC 2013 Annual Report,” Clinical Toxicology 52, no. 10 (2014):1038, 
1055, DOI: 10.3109/15563650.2014.987397.  
6 The Lewin Group, Final Report on the Value of the Poison Center System, 2012, 
https://aapoisoncenters.s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs/memberresources/
Value_of_the_Poison_Center_System_FINAL_9_26_2012_--_FINAL_FINAL_FINAL.pdf, 1.  
7 “International Programme on Chemical Safety-Poisons Centres,” World Health Organizations.  
8 National Poison Data System, NPDS Coding Users’ Manual, American Association of Poison 
Control Center, 2014, https://aapcc.s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs/member-resources/NPDS_Coding_Users 
_Manual_v3.1_07May2014.pdf, 5. 
9 “National Poison Data System,” American Association of Poison Control Centers, accessed June 5, 
2015, http://www.aapcc.org/data-system.  
3 
B. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Can poison centers improve outcomes during public health emergencies? Is so, 
how can they be better leveraged to meet homeland security needs? This question was 
researched as it relates to poison center activities at local, state, and national levels during 
incidents resulting from manmade and naturally occurring events. Also considered were 
barriers to utilizing poison centers in this capacity. 
C. BACKGROUND 
The following paragraphs provide background information on how poison centers 
are structured as well as their evolving scope of function in order to establish a basic 
understanding of their capabilities and how these capabilities are applicable during a 
disaster. Review of the literature and empirical data suggests that recognition and 
appreciation for poison center’s capabilities are limited. 
Currently, there are 55 poison centers across the United States and U.S. 
territories10 that provide 24/7 triage response to over four million calls annually.11 The 
first poison center was started in Chicago in 1953,12 and by 1970, over six hundred 
poison centers had been established nationwide.13 In response to a growing numbers of 
pediatric deaths related to poisonings, the number of poison centers rose to 661 by 1978. 
These centers are staffed with professionals from a variety of health care and education 
professions that are trained in some aspect of toxicology.14 
Concurrent with the development of poison centers was the development of a 
national data collecting agency: the National Cleaning House for Poison Centers 
                                                 
10 “About,” American Association of Poison Control Center, accessed September 4, 2013, 
http://www.aapoison centers.org/about/. 
11 The Lewin Group, Final Report on the Value of the Poison Center System, 1.  
12 Institute of Medicine Committee on Poison Prevention and Control Board on Health Promotion and 
Disease Prevention, Forging a Poison Prevention and Control System (Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press, 2004), 81. 
13 Ibid., 24. 
14 M. A. Kostic, S. Rutherfoord-Rose, and Vikhyat S. Bebarta, “Understanding Poison Control and 
Protecting It’s Future,” Pediatric Annals 34, no 12 (2005): 984.   
4 
(NCHPC). The NCHPC was a department within the Food and Drug Administration 
FDA. Also established early on in the evolution of poison control centers was the 
American Association of Poison Control Centers (AAPCC). There were limitations found 
with the NHCPC as it had no formal relationship or ownership over poison control 
centers and no mandating reporting15  
During the 1980s and 1990s poison centers began to collaborate and refine their 
services under the direction of AAPCC. The AAPPC serves to provide support to the 
staff of poison centers through representation and partnership with other healthcare, 
nonprofit, and government agencies charged with reducing the number of poisoning, fatal 
outcomes as well as serving as the accreditation body for poison centers and for 
certification of poison center staff. In addition, the AAPCC manages its membership’s 
public relations activities, continuing education efforts, and toxicosurveillance efforts.16  
The first foray on the part of poison control centers into data collections was a 
paper-based system named the Toxic Exposure Surveillance System (TESS), initiated in 
1983.17 By 1996, this system was capturing 87 percent of all of the poisonings that were 
occurring nationwide.18  
The 2000s brought additional changes to poison control centers through the 
Poison Control Center Enhancement Act of 2000. This act called for supplemental 
funding to centers in order to enhance their current public and professional outreach 
education, the refinement and expansion of a toxicosurveillance system, stabilization of 
poison centers at risk for closing because of a lack of funding, and the establishment of a 
national effort around poison prevention education.19 This act, signed into law by 
President Clinton, forged a partnership between the AAPCC, the Health Resources and 
                                                 
15 Institute of Medicine Committee, Forging a Poison Prevention and Control System, 83. 
16 Ibid., 88. 
17 Ibid., 90. 
18 Toby Litovitz, “The Tess Database, Use in Product Safety Assessment,” Drug Safety 18, no. 1 
(1998): 10.   
19 Lewis R. Goldfrank, “Call Centers, Disaster Medicine, and Public Health Preparedness,” Disaster 
Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 3, no. 3 (2009): 136, DOI: 10.1097/DMP.0b013e3181b9dbaa.  
5 
Services Administration (HRSA), and the Center for Disease Control (CDC). Success of 
this partnership includes the initiation of a national poison prevention awareness 
campaign and the development of one national 800 number for professional and public 
access.20 There have been some additions to the Poison Control Center Enhancement Act 
over the years including the 2003 amendments to the act, which included the 
recommendation that the public utilize poison control centers for information on 
chemical, nuclear, and biological threats.21 
1. Clinical Expertise 
A poison center, in order to meet accreditation criteria must be staffed by 
physicians who attained board certification in medical toxicology; similarly pharmacists 
must attain certification in clinical toxicology, and a mix of physicians, registered nurses 
and pharmacists must be certified as specialists in poison information (CSPI). Poison 
centers are also staffed with public health educators.22 Their rolls, while different, do 
overlap to provide a comprehensive approach to managing a poisoned patient. 
The majority of staff working in a poison center are CSPIs. It is their role to 
respond to the emergency hotline and quickly assess the need for medical attention when 
someone has been exposed to a toxin. If the CSPI is a registered nurse, his or her clinical 
background prior to working in a poison center often includes emergency or intensive 
care nursing experience. If she or he is a pharmacist, it may include experience working 
in a hospital based clinical setting.  
2. Staff Certification 
Attaining certification as a CSPI requires that the staff person pass a national 
certification exam administered by the AAPCC. This exam is given annually to anyone 
                                                 
20 Poison Control Center Enhancement and Awareness Act, 2000, Government Printing Office, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-117/pdf/STATUTE-117-Pg2888.pdf. 
21 Poison Control Center Enhancement and Awareness Act, 2003, Government Printing Office, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ194/pdf/PLAW-108publ194.pdf. 
22 Henry A. Spiller, and Jill R. K. Griffith, “The Value and Evolving Role of the U.S. Poison Control 
Center System,” Public Health Reports 124, no. 3 (2009): 361.   
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that is working in the capacity of a specialist in poison information and has completed 
2000 hours of work in a poison center and has managed 2000 cases.23 Once certified, the 
staff person must recertify every seven years by retaking this exam. 
Medical toxicologists are medical doctors that often function in the capacity of 
medical directors and oncall consultants for the poison centers. Their work commitment 
may vary depending on the organizational structure from a halftime to fulltime position. 
Medical toxicologists attain board certification by the American College of Medical 
Toxicologist (ACMT) as well within their own medical specialty, such as emergency 
medicine, pediatrics, occupational medicine, or internal medicine. In addition, medical 
toxicology is now recognized as an accredited medical fellowship.24  
Clinical toxicologists are doctors of pharmacy that attain board certification in 
clinical toxicology by the American Board of Applied Toxicology. They provide a 
variety of functions within a poison center, including managing director, clinical director, 
toxicology consultants, and CSPIs.  
Public health educators working within a poison center have varied educational 
backgrounds. Some hold degrees in education, health care education, nursing, medicine, 
pharmacy, or public health. While there is no formal education required for this position, 
there are mentorship programs, opportunities for collaborations, and membership within 
the AAPCC Public Education Committee (PEC).25 
3. Center Accreditation 
Not only do staff members need to attain certification within their specialty, but 
poison centers must also be accredited by the AAPCC to be a recognized center within 
the AAPCC membership, receive state and federal support, and participate in AAPCC 
initiatives, such as toxicosurveillance. The accreditation process is a peer review process 
                                                 
23 “CSPI Exam Criteria for Specialists in Poison Information,” American Association of Poison 
Control Centers, accessed November 5, 2015, https://aapcc.s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs/member-.  
24 Robert S. Hoffman et al., Goldfrank’s Toxicologic Emergencies, 10th ed. (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 2015), 12.  
25 Institute of Medicine Committee, Forging a Poison Prevention and Control System, 212. 
7 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach to assess the level of performance of each 
center. An accreditation review committee made up on representatives from the 
membership, not including board members, reviews applications, and conducts face-to-
face interviews with center staff as part of the accreditation process. Currently, all 55 
poison centers are accredited. Each center must submit an application for accreditation 
every seven years and verify annually that in compliance with all of the accreditation 
regulations.26 
One of the key components of accreditation is that everyone has access to the 
poison center. In order to ensure this access, all poison centers must have a toll free 
number that is promoted and marketed throughout their catchment area. Access to this 
number must include provision for callers that are hearing impaired as well those with 
language barriers requiring an interpreter or the ability to connect to a language line. Staff 
must also be able to triage the calls effectively to ensure that exposures calls are handled 
prior to information calls and that calls from 911 and EMS are prioritized as well.27 
How a poison center is staffed also comes under AAPCC accreditation guidelines. 
These guidelines ensure that all centers have a medical director, CSPI staff, a managing 
director, and an education staff. The educational background, certification, and ongoing 
training of all clinical staff must be documented. Additionally, there also needs to be 
documentation around the public education efforts, which includes presentations, public 
service announcements (PSAs), delivery of poison prevention literature, and ongoing 
needs assessments and evaluations of initiatives. All efforts around professional 
education, such as clinical rotations, toxicology presentations, and contributions to 
scholarly journals, should be documented.28 
Having the ability to track and report on calls is also a key component of 
accreditation as toxicosurveillance is an integral poison center function. Equally 
                                                 
26 “New Accreditation Criteria: November 2014,” American Association of Poison Control Centers 
[AAPCC], February 27, 2014, accessed November 6, 2015, www.aapcc.org/members/?title=&post 
_date=&resource_types=27#search 1. 
27 Spiller, and Griffith, “The Value and Evolving Role of the U.S. Poison Control,” 360. 
28 “New Accreditation Criteria: November 2014,” AAPCC.  
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important is the ability to demonstrate that quality initiatives, including review of cases 
and patient satisfaction surveys, are conducted.29 Compliance with all of these 
regulations ensures that each poison center is providing the same standard of care, that 
there is continuity of care across the poison center enterprise and that patient outcomes 
and trends are tracked on timely bases in order to validate research, and support accepted 
treatment modalities.  
4. Access 
Poison centers have a call center infrastructure that allows for multiple callers to 
call into the center at one time, they have access to language lines to manage calls from 
non-English speaking callers, TTDY lines in place for callers who are hearing impaired 
and can accommodate additional staff to work during call surges. Many poison centers 
are now set up to allow for staff to work remotely. This accommodation provides 
continuity of services if the physical call center is located in a disaster area.30  
Poison centers have an established relationship with staff of departments of 
health, healthcare facilities, emergency medical personnel, and the media. These 
relationships help facilitate productive communication during crisis situations.31 
5. Funding 
Poison centers are funded from different sources at the local, state, and national 
levels. State funding, which accounts for approximately 80 percent of their income, is 
used primarily to offset staffing costs. Many centers are located within a host institution 
such as hospitals, or universities. Some centers are affiliated with their host hospital’s 
department of pharmacy or emergency medicine. For those located within a university, 
they are often connected to the school of pharmacy. There are some centers that receive 
                                                 
29 Ibid.  
30 Valerie A. Yeager, “Emergency Response, Public Health and Poison Control: Logical Linkages for 
Successful Risk Communication and Improved Disaster and Mass Incident Response,” Homeland Security 
Affairs 5, no. 3(September 2009): 3–4. 
31 Kathy Lehman-Huskamp, and Anthony J. Scalzo, “Acute Disaster Response: Lessons Learned from 
a Small-scale Event,” Journal of Clinical Toxicology 1, no. 104 (2011): 4, DOI: 10.4172/2161-
0495.1000104.  
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private funding through insurance companies, add-ons to cost of purchasing license 
plates, or telephone surcharges. Poison center funding is often challenged on both the 
state and federal levels, forcing centers to look for creative funding solutions.32  
Most centers receive some federal dollars to support educational and or 
technology needs.33 The Poison Enhancement Act of 2000, which allowed for federal 
funding and partnership with HRSA, has been an effective effort to stabilize many 
centers and ensure that public and professional education efforts are maintained. Of the 
136 million dollars spent, only 13 percent is federal funded.34 There have been several 
reauthorizations of this Act that have resulted in a reduction of funding35 
6. Scope of Service 
Poison centers provide a variety of functions from triaging a poisoned patient to 
providing poison prevention education and awareness in order to prevent poisoning from 
occurring. The following paragraphs provide a description of poison center services.  
a. Phone Triage 
Poison centers are most recognized for work around phone medical triage. Calls 
are received from the general public as well as from health care providers who are 
looking for both poison information and management recommendations. These calls 
come from a variety of sources including homes, schools, industries, and hospitals. The 
majority of the calls managed by poison center staff are from the home, and in most 
cases, the patients can be safely managed at home.36 This service reduces the number of 
unnecessary hospital visits and reduces the stress on busy emergency department staff as 
                                                 
32 Spiller, and Griffith, “The Value and Evolving Role of the U.S. Poison Control,” 362. 
33 Pourmand, Wang, and Mazer, “A Survey of Poison Control Centers Worldwide,” 1. 
34 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Poison Control Center Laws,” 2011, accessed July 8, 
2015, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/poison-control-center-state-laws.aspx.  
35 American Association of Poison Control Centers, “Poison Center in Danger,” accessed July 8, 
2015, http://www.aapcc.org/about/poison-centers-danger/. 
36 Poison Center Task Force, “Poison Centers: An Information Paper,” ACEP, September 2010, 
http://www.acep.org/Content.asp?id=70370&terms=poison%20center, 1–2.  
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well as the trauma to a patient associated with an emergency room visit. The algorithm in 
Figure 1 illustrates how calls are triaged by CSPIs. 
 
Figure 1.  Call Algorithm 
 
Source: Institute of Medicine, Forging a Poison Prevention and Control System, 108. 
b. Poison Education Awareness 
Poison prevention education and awareness continues to be integral to poison 
control center initiatives. Spiller and Griffith maintain that prevention education reduces 
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emergency department visits and awareness education increases utilization37 The 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) report also acknowledges that while tracking and managing 
poisonings are in the forefront of poison center, functions so is poison prevention 
education. The public education committee of the AAPCC was established to standardize 
some of the poison prevention education across all poison control centers and to provide 
a vehicle for vetting some of the “homegrown initiatives” utilized from state to state. 
There is also a federal supported initiative around prevention education through HRSA.38  
c. Professional Education 
Professional education activities include serving as a clinical rotation site for 
medical, nursing and pharmacy students, presenting at local, state, and national 
conferences, conducting ongoing research, and contributing to scholarly journals and 
textbooks.39 One of the most important aspects of providing professional education to 
health care providers is to help them gain a better understanding of the scopes and service 
of a poison center and to demonstrate how a poison center can help them with their 
patient care.  
d. Toxicosurveillance 
The National Poison Data System (NPDS) is used nationwide to conduct real-
time toxicosurveillance around biological, chemical, radiological threats. NPDS allows 
centers across the county, in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, to employ an “all hazards” approach to identifying threats and provide a 
framework for poison centers to collect data on human and animal exposures related to 
poisonings.40  
                                                 
37 Spiller, and Griffith, “The Value and Evolving Role of the U.S. Poison Control,” 61. 
38 Institute of Medicine, Forging a Poison Prevention and Control System, 131. 
39 Spiller, and Griffith, “The Value and Evolving Role of the U.S. Poison Control,” 61. 
40 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Radiation Emergencies Public Health Roundtable: The 
Role of Poison Centers (Atlanta, GA: Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012), 
http://emergency.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/summary_report-
_radiological_emergencies_public_health_roundtable_4-29-13.pdf, 8–9.  
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e. Disaster Planning 
During a disaster, poison centers play a role in disseminating information to the 
general public through media releases, interviews, and website postings. Poison center 
staff also assess the degree of exposures, direct callers to the appropriate level of care if 
needed, and provide treatment advice to health care providers, particularly to those health 
care facilities in remote and rural areas that may not have experience, training, or 
expertise in managing this type of exposures.41  
7. Situational Awareness 
Poison centers provide situational awareness around drug abuse trends, effects of 
new products on the market and the misuse of drugs and chemicals. During 2011 Poison 
Center detected and tracked growing abuse around a new synthetic drug coined “bath 
salts.” A study conducted at the Texas Poison Centers demonstrated the growing 
frequency in abuse cases with this drug from 2010 to 2011. This center was able to detect 
this trend and provide management guidelines to health care providers.42  
8. Public Health Response 
There have been several programs and initiatives that have resulted from 
collaborations with national partners and organizations, such as the CDC, HRSA, 
Consumer Protective Safety, and SafeKids. One initiative that has been very successful is 
the Preventing Overdoses and Treatment Exposure Task Force (PROTECT) initiative. In 
response to the growing number of children that are involved in unintentional exposures 
to medications, a group of public health partners convened to develop strategies and 
implement educational programs to address this issue.43 
                                                 
41 Ibid.  
42 Mathias B. Forrester, and Tracy Haywood, “Synthetic Cathinone Exposure Reported to Texas 
Poison Centers,” The American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse 38 (2012): 614.  
43 Daniel S. Budnitz, and Salis, Spencer, “Preventing Medication Overdoses in Young Children: An 
Opportunity for Harm Reduction,” Pediatrics 127, no. 6 (2011): 1598.  
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Another example of a collaborative public health response is poison center’s 
involvement with the CDC’s “Flu on Call.” This program was developed in response to 
the growing concerning over a pandemic flu occurring in this country.44 More details of 
this collaboration with program are provided in Chapter II. 
While there are variations between each poison center in the delivery of these 
services, what does remain constant are those efforts around case management, 
intelligence gathering, disaster response, and prevention education. In the subsequent 
chapters, there is a more extensive discussion of each of these efforts with corresponding 
examples, case studies, and a critical look at the effectiveness of each service.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A literature review was conducted to examine the research and published 
materials on effectiveness of poison centers in areas such as disaster response, 
situitational awareness, communication, collaboration, reduction of health care costs, and 
clinical expertise. Also reviewed where those agencies who conduct biological and 
chemical surviellance. Key words and phrases used for this literature search included: 
biosurveillance, toxicosurveillance, poisonings, and poison control centers. Sources used 
for this search were obtained from Naval Postgraduate School’s Dudley Knox Library 
and the Upstate Medical University Library.  
This literature review is divided into the following areas: chemical and bio 
surveillance, federal response, surveillance methods, and poison centers surveillance. 
These categories were utilized in order to compare and contrast other surveillance 
initiatives with those of poison centers as well other poison center’s functions around 
planning, response, and mitigation of threats to our communities. 
                                                 
44 Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, “Flu on CallTM: An Innovative Strategy to 
Provide Services to ILL People and Reduce Demand on Medical Facilities during a Severe Pandemic,” 
accessed November 6, 2015, http://www.astho.org/Preparedness/Flu-on-Call/Flu-on-Call-issue-Brief//.  
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1. Chemical and Bio Surveillance—Federal Response  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-12 calls for data collection and 
analysis relative to human and an animal threats and illness occurring from infectious 
processes, toxic exposures as a result of a manmade or natural disaster.45 The stated 
purpose of this data collection and analyses is to provide the general public, public health 
professionals, health care providers, and government officials with information early in 
the course of an occurrence to help minimize the impact and initiate the appropriate 
response.46 Homeland Security Directive 21 expands on this and includes a nationwide 
effort inclusive of state and local efforts.47 The National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and Biodefense for the 
21st Century also calls for an integrated approach to preparing for a catastrophic health 
event.48 This integrated approach calls for collaboration and involvement around 
preparedness among various governmental agencies, members of the community, 
representation from colleges and universities, health care providers, public health 
professionals, and families in their designated area.49 
The CDC is a leading agency in biosurveillance. It has several programs that 
address infectious disease and biological threats in this country and across the globe. In 
their article, Christian et al. chronicle some of the activities of the CDC’s Disease 
Detection Program. In addition, she and her colleagues review some of the most common 
disease threats in 2012 and 2013, including but not limited to MERS and influenza.50  
                                                 
45 Nicholas E. Kman, and Daniel J. Bachmann, “Biosurveillance: A Review and Update,” Advances in 
Prevention Medicine 206, no. 8 (2012): 2. DOI: 10.1155/2012/301408.   
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Ali S. Khan et al., “The Next Public Health Revolution: Public Health Information Fusion and 
Social Networks,” American Journal of Public Health 100, no. 7 (2010): 1238, DOI: 10.2015/
AJPH.2009.180489.  
49 National Security Council, National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (Washington, DC: 
National Security Council, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/National 
_Strategy_for_Countering_BioThreats.pdf. 
50 Kira A. Christian et al., “What We Are Watching: Five Top Global Infectious Disease Threats, 
2012: A Perspective from the CDC’s Global Disease Detection Operations Center,” Emerging Health 
Threats Journal 6, no. 10 (2013): 3, 6.   
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One of the CDC’s programs is called Biosense. It was started in 2003 as part of 
the CDC’s Public Health Network to collect from Department of Defense (DOD) 
information from its outpatient clinics any case trends and suspicious or concerning 
patient presentations that are consistent with unusual and emerging infectious diseases. In 
2005, Biosense was expanded to include non-DOD health care facilities as well. Tokars 
et al. were the first to conduct research and publish an analysis of the effectiveness of 
Biosense. They reviewed 2008 data and concluded from their findings that the program 
needed to be expanded; there needed to be an increased use of electronic monitoring and 
that data sharing and engagement needed to occur on a local level.51 
The CDC has extended its reach beyond the traditional reporting sources, noted 
above, to include the Early Aberration Systems, which tracks EMS calls, drug store 
purchases, animal visits, and missed school days. Kman and Bachman look at each of 
these systems as well as those based on laboratory analysis, the resulting reporting, and 
environmental tracking such as the CDC’s Biowatch. They suggest that despite funding 
and multiple efforts, the current system for tracking is deficient. These authors call for a 
more unified approach that tracks threats across the globe that ensures effective and 
accurate reporting utilizing innovative technology.52 
The CDC is not the only government agency involved in surveillance, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) oversees the Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and 
Response system, which is housed under the Division of Armed Forces Health 
Surveillance Center (AFHSC). This project falls under the preview of the deputy 
secretary of defense. The goal of this program is to detect, respond, conduct research, 
build partnerships around diseases that result in respiratory, gastrointestinal, or fever 
                                                 
51 Jerome Tokars et al., “Summary of Data Reported to CDC’s National Automated Biosurveillance 
System, 2008,” BMC Public Health 10, no. 30 (2010): 9–11, DOI: 10.1186/1472-6947-10-30. 
52 Kman, and Bachmann, “Biosurveillance: A Review and Update,” 2.  
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systems and include sexually transmitted disease, airborne, or aerosolized agents and 
those diseases that are resistant to antibiotics.53  
The Department of Homeland Security’s fusion centers are also involved with 
surveillance activities. These fusion centers are geographical diverse, and with a 
multidisciplinary staff, they engage both public and private collaborators.54 One of their 
initiatives was a pilot program called BioPHusion, which was launched by the CDC. The 
objectives of this pilot are to gather emerging information, determine threats, and act on 
these threats through sharing of information. Surveillance efforts were conducted using 
such tools as Global Public Health Information Network (GPHIN), ProMed, Google 
searches, and Argus. A review was conducted of the data collected and information 
exchanged from July of 2008 through July of 2009, conclusion drawn from this study is 
that innovation is needed, not around the development of new surveillance tools but 
rather on a social network construct that brings together federal, state, and local 
stakeholders that not only allows for but encourages the exchange of information.55  
2. Surveillance Methods 
There are numerous methodologies utilized with surveillance. Some focus on the 
point of entry into a health care facility, as described by Griffin et al. Griffin  discusses 
the utility of gathering from emergency departments the number of patients and their 
presenting flu-like symptoms as a predictor of outbreaks.56 Biosense utilizes both 
syndromic surveillance and case-based surveillance. The first term refers to presenting 
symptoms, and the latter refers to verifiable quantitative results.57 
                                                 
53 Kevin L. Russell et al., “The Global Emerging Infection Surveillance and Response System (GEIS): 
A U.S. Government Tool for Improved Global Biosurveillance: A Review of 2009,” BMC Public Health 
11, no. 52 (2011): 2, 10, DOI: 10.1186/1471-2458-11-S2-S2.  
54 Khan et al., “The Next Public Health Revolution,” 1238.  
55 Ibid., 1240.  
56 Beth Ann Griffin et al., “Early Detection of Influenza Outbreaks Using the DC Department of 
Health’s Syndromic Surveillance System,” BMC Public Health 9, no. 483 (2009): 17, DOI: 10.1186/1471-
2458-9-483.  
57 Tokars et al., “Summary of Data Reported,” 9–11. 
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Nelson et al. presents a less restricted and more collaborative approach to 
collecting epidemic intelligence. In addition, Nelson describes the utility of using Internet 
sources such as Twitter, FaceBook, or Google searches or event-based surveillance. 
Event-based surveillance is utilizing Internet sources for the recognition and tracking of 
disease outbreaks. Nelson reviews common biosurveillance systems such as Project 
Argus, BioCaster, Global Public Health Intelligence (GPHIN), and HealthMap.58 Each of 
these systems uses a different language, provides large amounts of data that has to be 
validated and distilled down to something manageable, and must perform in a timely 
manner.  
Nelson et al. reported on their research project that looked to compare WHO and 
that collected by the Argus system for H1N1 reported cases from August 2009 to January 
2010.59 The areas they compared include: the number of reported cases, the number of 
deaths, shortage of hospital beds and resources, vaccine reactions or infective vaccines, 
and co-morbidities. Results suggest that unlike more traditional and official systems, 
Internet surveillance is open to the general public and the information is disseminated in 
real time.60 
An example of how an Internet-based search has utility in responding to a public 
outbreak is with the incident dengue fever in Madeira in October of 2012. An Internet 
search during September of 2012 revealed several documented reports on an increase in 
the mosquito population; this was followed by several confirmed cases of dengue fever 
one month later. This intelligence was shared across Europe, with the Portuguese public 
health officials, and the general public. Quick sharing of this information allowed for a 
quick response, such as limiting travel and exchange of goods.61  
                                                 
58 Noele P. Nelson et al., “Event-Based Internet Biosurveillance: Relation to epidemiological 
Observation,” Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 9, no. 1 (2012): 2. DOI: 10.1186/1742-7622-9-4. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid., 3. 
61 David M. Hartley et al., “An Overview of Internet Biosurveillance,” Clinical Microbiology and 
Infection 19, no. 11 (2013): 1010, DOI: 10.1111/1469-0691.12273.  
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3. Poison Centers Surveillance 
The National Poison Data System (NPDS) collects data from all of the nations 
poison centers on human and animal exposures related to poisonings. Cases are uploaded 
to the CDC every eight minutes.62 Once the data is uploaded, a national 
toxicosurveillance team from the AAPCC membership reviews the data and looks for 
outliers, trends, an increase in clinical effects, and an increase in call volumes.63  
Simone and Spiller suggest that NPDS data is more reliable and timely than what 
is generated by other national surveillance systems and has great utility in its ability to 
upgrade its coding.64 NPDS can be updated to reflect new coding needs by engaging the 
NPDS Rapid Response Coding Team. Simone and Spiller also noted that the accuracy of 
the data is better than some systems and comparable to others.65  
The National Injury Prevention Surveillance System—Med Watch captured 
significantly fewer adverse drug events than NPDS.66 The data collected from Toxic 
Exposure Surveillance System (TESS) and NPDS not only provides alerts regarding 
public health threats but also provides product safety information to industries and about 
their products.67 NPDS data is disseminated more rapidly as compared to other data such 
as the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Monthly (MMWR).The MMWR does not publish 
its findings until a trend is found, and the CDC’s hospital’s reported admission and death 
cases are published on an annual basis.68  
                                                 
62 Mowry et al., “AAPCC 2013 Annual Report,” 1039. 
63 Amy F. Wolkin et al., “Using Poison Center Data for National Public Health Surveillance for 
Chemical and Poison Exposure and Associated Illness,” Annals of Emergency Medicine 59, no. 1 (2012): 
58–59, DOI: 10.1016/j.annemergmed.2011.08.004.  
64 Karen K. Simone, and Henry A. Spiller, “Poison Center Surveillance Data: The Good, the Bad 
and...the Flu,” Clinical Toxicology 48, no. 5 (2010): 416.   
65 Elizabeth J. Scharman, “Liquid ‘Laundry Pods’: A Missed Global Toxicosurveillance Opportunity, 
Clinical Toxicology 50, no. 8 (2012): 725.    
66 Simone, and. Spiller, “Poison Center Surveillance Data,” 416.  
67 Litovitz, “The Tess Database, Use in Product Safety Assessment,” 19. 
68 Simone, and. Spiller, “Poison Center Surveillance Data,” 416. 
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Scharman highlighted some of the drawbacks to the NPDS system. This system 
requires that specific product codes be entered in order to trigger an alert, suggesting an 
outlier has been detected. In May 2012, poison centers started receiving calls regarding 
exposures to liquid laundry pods. These cases were not entered into the NPDS database 
with a specific code because none existed at that point in time. Collegial information 
sharing regarding toxicity and outcome occurred via email between toxicologists from 
various poison control centers. Scharman suggests that NPDS alone is not sufficient and 
that sharing of information formally and informally across a variety of agencies is equally 
if not more reliable.69  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Can poison centers improve outcomes during public health emergencies? Is so, 
how can they be better leveraged to meet homeland security needs? A descriptive case 
study analysis was conducted to determine if poison center utilization during public 
health emergencies improves outcomes. The analysis was centered on five of the core 
functions that poison centers nationwide provide. These core functions, as defined by the 
AAPCC, and include disaster response, providing situational awareness around emerging 
threats, communication of these threats to the general public and to health care 
responders, provision of clinical expertise and reducing the burden on health care 
facilities by preventing unnecessary emergency department visits, and reducing 
hospitalized patient’s length of stay.70  
The evaluated literature search case studies and research demonstrated both 
effectiveness of poison center utilization during emergencies and inherent limitations. 
Knowledge of poison center’s function, scope of services, and clinical expertise are not 
widely known within the homeland security expertise. Cases studies and examples that 
demonstrate these capabilities were analyzed for this thesis. 
                                                 
69 Scharman, “Liquid ‘Laundry Pods,’” 725.  
70 Poison Center Task Force, “Poison Centers: An Information Paper,” 1–2.  
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Although individual poison centers vary somewhat in their capabilities, this 
analysis considered all poison centers in the country collectively. Poison centers not only 
have a shared mission, but each of the 55 recognized poison centers work collaboratively 
and are aligned through their membership within the AAPCC. The staff members from 
poison centers are elected to the board of the AAPCC where they serve on various 
organizational wide committees, represent the AAPCC on national level efforts, and 
drive organizational decisions. Center accreditation is approved by members appointed to 
the AAPCC Accreditation Committee. The criteria for accreditation are standardized 
across all centers. This criterion requires that poison centers be staffed similarly, 
contribute to the same surveillance database, provide comparable case management and 
engage in each of these core functions.71 
The functions were analyzed as follows: 
1. Disaster response: this function includes poison centers actions in the 
planning for and response to public health emergencies. The research 
assessed poison center’s involvement is small- and large-scale disasters. 
The reviewed case studies included provision of clinical care, distribution 
of antidotes, and interaction with the general public through public service 
announcements and other types of messaging. 
2. Situational awareness: this function is the tracking of trends that have the 
potential to threaten the well being of individuals and/or communities. 
These threats may be of a biological, chemical, or nuclear nature. They 
may be from natural or manmade causes. The threats are primarily 
detected when multiple cases are entered into the NPDS and the 
surveillance team detects an unusual occurrence or a high incidence of 
occurrence. A threat may also be detected when a center starts receiving 
numerous calls regarding a similar exposure or has multiple patients with 
unusual clinical presentations. 
This research looked at those incidences when a poison center’s 
toxicosurveillance efforts provided detection of a threat that enabled an 
early warning to be initiated to health care and public health responders. 
Also considered were those occasions when efforts to inform the general 
public about an emerging threat was triggered by a poison center’s 
surveillance efforts. Cases were reviewed that demonstrated how these 
surveillance efforts influenced response efforts and policy decisions.  
                                                 
71 “New Accreditation Criteria: November 2014,” AAPCC.  
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3. Communication: this function refers to how poison centers communicate 
information to the general public during an emergency, to health care and 
public health responders, to their colleagues at other centers, and within 
each of their centers. It includes interactions with the media, engagement 
of social media, and perception and utilization by the general public. This 
research focused on those conditions when the general public contacted a 
poison centers for information and guidance during a disaster, as well as 
how often. Also taken into consideration was the effectiveness in 
communication between poison center staff and health care providers as 
well as among poison center staff. 
4. Reducing burden on health care: the research around this function 
pertained to documented evidence that poison centers reduce the number 
of unnecessary emergency department visits and hospital admission.  
5. Clinical expertise: this function concerns clinical expertise that poison 
centers provide in the area of toxicologic emergencies. This research 
looked to determine if there was a link between medical outcome and 
consultation with a state poison center during a disaster. Case studies were 
examined poison center effectiveness, if and when poison center staff 
provided early identification and treatment recommendations during a 
threat. 
Based on the analysis of the research, collected recommendations were 
formulated on how to more effectively levage these core functions. These 
recommendations have direct impact on health care providers with in health care 
facilities, emergency medical services, and county and state departments of health. They 
support local, state, and federal efforts including those around law enforcement, disasters 
planning, response, and mitigation. These recommendations include implementation 
strategies, a summary of benefits, and desired outcome measures that would help 
legislators and policy makers enact laws and support programs with a focus on 
emergency response.  
There are some inherent limitations to analyzing this problem including the 
subjectivity of the researcher and limited objective cases studies on poison center efficacy 
in disaster response. The researcher is able to provide detailed information on the day to 
functioning of poison centers and has an appreciation of some of the nuisances of the 
organization based on over 20 years of experience working in a poison center and as a 
member of the AAPCC. The researcher has attempted a balanced evaluation by 
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examining not only the positive contributions that poison centers make during a disaster 
but also their inherent limitations. Finally, while there is limited research on poison 
centers effectiveness in disaster response, there is published studies on their effectiveness 
around these core functions.  
F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Part of this research was to gain a greater understanding of the role poison centers 
play during normal operations and during a disaster. The following chapters examine the 
five core functions as they relate to homeland security. Chapter II provides cases studies 
illustrating poison center’s response during several high profile disasters. Chapter III 
focuses on the situtional awareness component of a poison center’s role in disaster 
response. Chapter IV focuses on internal and external communications capabilities and 
challenges. The clinical expertise of poison center staff, including CSPIs, toxicologists 
and educators, are presented in Chapter V. The focus of Chapter VI is how poison centers 
reduce the burden on health care facilities during a disaster as demonstrated health care 
cost savings attributed to poison center utilization. Included in each chapter are 
recommendations to better leverage these function. Finally, Chapter VII provides 





II. DISASTER RESPONSE 
A. OVERVIEW 
A disaster is defined as an event that involves a large number of people, with 
patients displaying significant symptoms requiring medical attention to the extent that 
medical response is overwhelmed by the volume. Some researchers think that this 
definition should include small-scale events that do not involve a large number of people 
but still present a challenge to the medical responders due to unfamiliarity of the 
exposure.72  
Regardless of the size of the disaster, poison centers play a role in disaster 
response. The educational background and toxicology experience of a poisons center’s 
staff prepares them to triage quickly and assess the need for medical attention when 
exposed to a toxin. This ability to assess over the phone decreases the number of 
unnecessary emergency room visits during a disaster.73 In addition, a poison center’s 
staff has expertise and knowledge of various chemicals and their clinical effects. 
Information regarding these chemicals can be provided over the phone or can be faxed to 
those individuals onsite of a chemical spill. Ongoing provision of information to the 
general public is through media releases, interviews, and website postings.74 
Over the last 100 years, there have been numerous documented disasters related 
to intentional and unintentional exposures to occupational chemicals, warfare agents, 
contaminated medications, food borne illnesses, and radiation. For example, World War I 
soldiers were exposed to chlorine phosgene and mustard gas; during the Vietnam War 
soldiers were exposed to Agent Orange.75 Exposures to contaminated food have run the 
                                                 
72 Lehman-Huskamp, and Scalzo, “Acute Disaster Response: Lessons Learned,” 2.  
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gamut from peanut butter contaminated with salmonella to coffee tainted with arsenic.76 
There have been incidences of product tampering, such as with the Tylenol and cyanide 
in the 1970s,77 and cases of mass suicides with drugs. One example is with the Heaven’s 
Gate cult. Thirty-nine members ended their life by ingesting a combination of alcohol and 
phenobarbital.78  
Ivy et al. conducted a study looking at inclusion of deaf and hard of hearing 
inividuals in diaster prepardeness. Their study reveiled that poison centers are able to 
respond to that gap with the presences of TTY and language lines.79 This is also an 
AAPCC requirement for center accrediation.80 
Common to these and other disaster scenarios is the role poison centers have 
played in tracking these occurrences, providing early identification of the agent, 
informing and updating the public on update health concerns, and providing health care 
providers with treatment recommendations. The following paragraphs describe in detail 
some examples of incidences that occurred and the role poison centers played in disaster 
response. 
B. TYPES OF DISASTERS 
There are numerous types of disasters resulting from natural and manmade 
causes. A description of the different types of disasters and poison centers roles in 
responding to each type of disaster is provided in the following paragraphs. 
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1. Intentional Product Contamination 
On April 27, 2003, staff of the Northern New England Poison Center began 
experiencing an influx of calls from callers experiencing “food poisoning like 
symptoms.” The hourly rate of calls exceeded the average call rate and the similarity in 
symptoms, and the timeframe was such that the National Poison Data System (NPDS) 
early warning alert system was triggered. History obtained by the CSPIs working in the 
poison center revealed that each of these callers had attended a church picnic. It was 
further determined that the one common substance that they all had consumed was 
coffee. There were 16 people with symptoms and their symptoms were consistent with 
those of arsenic poisoning. This diagnosis was later confirmed when the perpetrator left a 
suicide note taking credit for the incident, which was the contamination of the coffee with 
arsenic.81 
2. Intentional Biological and Chemical Exposures 
Only days after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, the 
citizens of the U.S. were faced with a growing concern around anthrax exposures. On 
October 4, the first case of inhalation anthrax was diagnosed and this led to several more 
cases, including one in New York City on October 12.82 In total, there were 18 cases 
identified in Florida, New York City, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut. The outcomes ranged from full recovery to the death of five. The source of 
these exposures came in the form of a letter that contained the anthrax spores. These 
letters, when processed and subsequently opened, contained sufficient enough anthrax 
spores to produce symptoms.83 
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Poison centers played a critical role during the anthrax scare. The Texas Poison 
Center alone managed over five hundred anthrax related calls.84 In addition, its staff, like 
other poison center staff across the country, developed messaging on for the general 
public and health care professionals on transmission, symptoms, and treatment. The 
Texas Poison Center utilized its existing infrastructure and communication network to get 
the information to those in need. Furthermore, its partners included staff from local and 
state health departments as well as government, community, and health care leaders85 
A poison center played a similar role when ricin was found in a postal facility in 
South Carolina on October 15, 2003. Through a team approach, which included the 
poison center for that area, close surveillance of patients presenting and admitted to 
health care facilities during that timeframe were screened to rule out an exposure.86 The 
CDC reached out to the AAPCC and the NPDS team and directed them to review all of 
their incoming cases on an hourly basis to look for symptoms suggestive of ricin 
exposure. Nationwide surveillance and reporting was provided by the AAPCC and was 
shared with state and national partners including law enforcement.87  
3. Unintentional Disasters—Naturally Occurring 
Hurricane Sandy made landfall on October 29, 2012 hitting parts of the New 
Jersey shoreline causing immediate and post disasters threats. One threat came in the 
days following the hurricane as residents began using alternative sources for cooking and 
heat such as generators. When generators or outdoor grills are used inside where there is 
poor ventilation, the risk for carbon monoxide poisoning ensues, which is what occurred 
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from October 29 and November 6. The New York City and New Jersey Poison Centers 
managed 263 calls regarding carbon monoxide poisonings.88 
4. Unintentional Disasters—Nuclear Accident 
When a disaster occurs anywhere in the world, Americans actively respond to the 
incident and provide on the ground support. This was such the case after the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant was damaged in March of 2011. The earthquake and 
resulting tsunami that caused such widespread and significant damage to Japan also 
impacted those individuals who had responded to the incident. U.S. poison centers 
managed over 400 calls, 60 that were exposure related and the remaining were 
information calls. Not all calls were received by the same poison center, rather the 
national poison data tracking system provided the link that allowed for the dissemination 
of timely and accurate information to the public.89 
5. Intentional Disasters—Occupational Related 
In West Virginia, after the January 9, 2014 chemical spill from the Freedom 
Industries in Charleston, the surrounding community’s water supply was contaminated 
and rendered unusable, affecting over 300,000 residents. The West Virginia poison center 
handled over 700 calls regarding this incident and managed to prevent numerous 
unnecessary emergency department visits by assessing and responding to callers through 
the poison hotline.90 
A similar response was noted after the 2010 Gulf Oil Spill. Not only did the 
Louisiana Poison Center track and respond to calls, but it also actively engaged at the 
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local, state, and federal levels in developing guidance around health issues and concerns 
resulting from the spill. The poison center worked with the CDC and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in providing a presence and response to the community and to 
state and federal officials. To date, this is considered one of the best examples of poison 
center integration in a national level response.91 
A small-scale occupational emergency occurred in St. Louis, Missouri on August 
2008 involving nine people exposed to the chemical p-nitroaniline. These patients arrived 
at different emergency departments with symptoms of green skin discoloration and 
difficulty breathing. Upon seeing patients with skin discoloration, emergency department 
staff assumed that the patients had a dermal exposure to this chemical and were at risk of 
exposing staff and other patients who may have come in contact with them. They 
initiated both decontamination efforts and isolation protocols for all patients and staff that 
had been in the waiting room and within the department.92 
The poison center in St Louis was contacted by emergency department staff for 
treatment recommendations. Hazmat was also contacted. The management 
recommendations provided by the poison center were not followed, and the directions 
provided by hazmat were not communicated to the emergency responders. There were no 
calls to either the poison center or hazmat made by the responders at the scene.93  
This failure to communicate and implement recommendations led to an incorrect 
assessment of the patient’s situation and the potential for cross contamination with staff 
and other patients. The greenish discoloration of the patients’ skin was due to the 
chemical causing the skin to turn yellow and the chemical reaction in the blood that 
caused a blue discoloration to the skin, which resulted in green skin. These patients were 
not a risk for spreading the chemical to other people. Based on this uninformed 
assumption, patients underwent unnecessary decontamination measures, and patients 
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waiting in the emergency departments for unrelated issues where delayed in receiving 
care and had to be isolated due to exposure to these patients.94 
6. Pandemic Flu and Ebola 
The potential for widespread flu reaching pandemic proportions has been a 
growing public health concern, particularly around the so called “bird flu” or H5N1 or 
H7N9.95 In response to this public health threat, the CDC is leading an effort to provide 
free phone triage to the general public in the event that flu pandemic occurs. It reached 
out to the following agencices to partner with them on this effort: the United Way 2–1-1, 
the AAPCC, the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services Resources and Service Administration, the National Association of 
County and City Health Officials, Public Health Management Corporation, the Council 
of State and Territorial Health Officials, and the Council of State and Territorial Health 
Officials. The CDC’s initatiative is called Flu on Call,TM96  
The intent of this initative was to implement the Flu on Call line in the in the event 
of a pandemic flu to respond to a public need and redue the strain on health care faclities 
from an influx of patients. A toll free number would be activated that would be 
anserwered by one of the nations 2–1-1 centers and their staff would would direct the 
caller, based on their needs and questions, to either their own physician or to one several 
particpating poison centers.97  
The plan had been to have a trained poison center CSPI available to provide 
guidance as well as facilite the caller’s obtaining antiviral medication if indicated. This 
process was intended to not only minimize impact on doctor’s office and hospitals but 
helps to contain the spread of this infectious disease by allowing callers to be treated at 
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home.98 At this point, poison centers would not be particpating in this initative, but the 
CDC along with its partners would continue to refine and work toward implementing this 
resource for the community.  
Poison Centers are well positioned to particpate in this type of initative as they 
have the phone lines in place, staff who are accustomed to responding to sick patients, 
and they have the ability to staff up based on a call surge. Furthermore, poison centers 
and the 211 particpated in two practice drills that tested their capabilties and 
demonstrated success in handling call surges.  
There are other similar poison center iniatives that support this model as well, 
including flu help lines that many centers established during the H1N1 pandemic flu in 
2009 to 2010. The Minnesota Center received over 27,000 flu related calls and managed 
to prevent 11,000 people from seeking unnecessary emergency department care.99 
During heightened concerns around Ebola cases in this country, several poison 
centers posted information sheets on their websites, including updates on the number of 
cases, symptoms, how the disease is spread and links to the CDC website. Some centers, 
such as the Illinois Poison Center and the North Carolina Poison Center, received their 
states’ designation as the Ebola hotline.100 
7. Planning and Drills 
Poison center staff members have participated on local and state disaster planning 
committees prior to September 11, 2001. Additionally, staff participate in local- and 
state-run disaster drills. Most recently, they have participated in the CDC’s Radiation 
Emergencies Public Health Round Table: The Role of Poison Centers. This roundtable 
was hosted by the CDC in Atlanta Georgia and brought together 36 staff members from 
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poison center’s across the country and high-ranking department of health staff from 
Georgia and Alabama for an intensive two-day program to discuss radiological and 
nuclear disasters.101 
During a disaster, poison centers would play a role in disseminating information 
to the general public through media releases, interviews, and website postings. Poison 
center staff would also assess the degree of exposures, direct callers to the appropriate 
level of care if needed, and provide treatment advice to health care providers, particularly 
to those health care facilities in remote and rural areas who may not have experience, 
training or expertise in managing this type of exposure.102 
8. Antidotes  
Poison centers also track available antidotes throughout a region. For example, 
they know which hospitals have snake antivenin. Poison centers staff have knowledge of 
the levels of care provided by the hospitals in their area and can direct a patient to the 
most appropriate facility.103 
The model of the Pittsburgh Poison Center is that it distributes the needed 
medications during a chemical or biological incident before the national stock is made 
available. This model allows for a quick response time and directly impacts patient 
outcomes. Other poison centers nationwide have adopted this model as well.104  
C. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The scenarios described in the previous sections demonstrate that poison center’s 
disaster response efforts are clearly linked to situational awareness, communication 
infrastructure, and staff’s clinical expertise. These centers are poised and ready to 
respond to a disaster. The ability to ramp up staffing with clinical experts who are able to 
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address chemical, biological, and nuclear threats is an asset to this country’s well being. 
Poison centers have the capabilities to provide a high level of clinical expertise while at 
the same time be cognizant of the need to conserve resources. This is done without 
compromise to quality patient care. 
One way that poison centers are able to respond to in an influx of calls during a 
disaster is through their remote staffing capabilities. Trained CSPIs have virtual poison 
centers at home that are linked to their poison centers. Calls come into their home offices 
and into the poison center at the same time. They are able to respond to callers, have the 
same access to resources, and can document the cases into the shared patient database. 
Remote staffing not only extends staffing possibilities, but in some cases, minimizes the 
need for staff to come in their centers to work. This would be most beneficial during a 
pandemic flu, when a physical center has been impacted by an event or when traveling is 
dangerous as in an ice storm or blizzard.  
Some of the benefits are anecdotal as there is limited published data around the 
role poison centers play during a disaster. Darracq et al. took on the task of reviewing the 
literature, surveying the managing directors from the poison centers nationwide on what 
role they have played during a disaster, collecting and analyzing the responses, and then 
publishing their findings. Additionally, they collected survey responses from the 
managing directors of 57 poison centers that were operational during the months from 
December 2011 to February 2012. The survey was designed to gather information 
regarding the role the centers played disaster planning and public health response.105 
The results of this study indicated that all of the 57 poison centers surveyed had a 
disaster plan in place. This is a marked improvement from the 1996 study where only half 
of the poison centers in the country had a disaster plan in place. Of equal interest in the 
results from this current study was that the managing directors from half of the centers 
stated they participated in disaster drills. Furthermore, 90 percent of them also described 
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a level of comfort in dealing disaster related issues but less than half indicated any 
involvement in post-disaster initiatives.106  
One way to address the improvement of participation in disaster drills is through 
ongoing efforts at the local, state, and federal levels in both participating and planning in 
small- and large-scale disaster exercises. This ongoing participation would increase a 
managing director’s opportunities to be involved in post-disaster initiatives as well—a 
deficiency that was also addressed in this study. 
Feedback provided by the participants in the CDC Radiation Roundtable Exercise 
was that more joint exercises and trainings were needed to increase their level of comfort 
in dealing with radiological disasters.107 Building on the success of this roundtable, the 
CDC should host annual exercises that include poison center staff. Staff should 
participate in FEMA trainings as well.  
The small-scale disasters presented in this chapter illustrate some areas where 
there needs to be a more collaborative approach to managing disasters. Lehman-Huskamp 
and Scalzo suggest that if the directions provided by hazmat had been communicated to 
the staff at the hospital, dealing with the p-nitroaniline exposure in St Louis, and if the 
emergency department staff that had reached out to their poison center and followed their 
direction, time and resources would not have been wasted and other patients would not 
have been inconvenienced. These authors further suggest that a poison center should be 
made aware of all hazmat notified events so that it could help distribute timely and 
effective recommendations to responding hospitals.108 A greater effort towards 
systematic integration of poison centers with other responding agencies, such as should 
be made. 
The Saint Louis case study, presented in Section B 5, Intentional Occupational 
Exposures, demonstrates how poison centers are not often involved in the initial response 
efforts after a mass poisoning. This is especially concerning when the disaster involves 
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chemical, biological, or radiological exposures. The initial contact with a poison center 
for a mass poisoning is often from an emergency department after it starts seeing patients. 
The implications of this delay are that emergency departments start to become inundated 
with patients, some of whom may not need emergency care. Involving the poison center 
not only reduces panic and contains the spread of a chemical or biological exposure but 
also conserves resources.  
The conservation of resources is key when dealing with a large-scale incident. 
These resources may include antidote, which poison centers track routinely, and can help 
with mobilization for one area of the country to another. Equally concerning is that 
hospital staff and emergency medical service (EMS) may be unfamiliar with the exposure 
agent. A lack of knowledge of anticipated symptoms, necessary self-protective 
precautions, and standard of care will all delay treatment and potentially put the health 
care providers at risk. Poison center staff have access to resources, the expertise and 
knowledge to develop management recommendations, the ability to provide guidance on 
precautions, and they are able to disseminate this information quickly and across a large 
catchment area.  
Effective disaster response occurs at all levels. Building strong working 
relationship and fostering communication is critical during these times. A neutral agency, 
such as a poison center, is able to be that conduit for effective and unfiltered 
communication during a crisis. The case studies, presented in Chapter II, Section 2, 
Intentional Biological and Chemical Exposures, regarding the anthrax and ricin scares, 
demonstrate the level of effective communication and the poison center’s role on a 
national level for providing timely and critical information to the general public regarding 
a threat. 
The case study regarding the coffee tainted with arsenic is an excellent example 
of the importance of strong collaborations on local, state, and federal levels. Having the 
knowledge and relationship with a poison center allows one to “tap in” those resources 
quickly and with confidence. In turn, a poison centers are able to reach out to their 
partners and engage them as needed.  
35 
Implementation of these recommendations should include developing a more 
collaborative relationship with agencies within the Department of Homeland Security, 
specifically with FEMA, as there would be enhanced opportunities to participate in 
disaster planning, response, and mitigation. Inclusion of poison centers in the planning of 
disasters would minimize the likelihood of delayed notifications to a potion center after 
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III. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
A. TOXICOSURVIELLANCE 
NPDS provides a framework for poison centers to collect data on human and 
animal exposures related to poisonings.109 This highly functional syndromic-based 
program is utilized by all AAPCC certified poison centers. Exposure cases called in to a 
poison center are entered into a data collection program at the local site and are then 
uploaded to the NPDS every eight seconds.110 A national toxicosurveillance team 
compromised of highly trained toxicologists from the American Association of Poison 
Control Center’s membership reviews the data on a daily basis looking for outliers, 
trends, increase in clinical effects, and call volumes. If a large number of cases or an 
unusual toxin is detected from a poison center, it is contacted to confirm and validate that 
the data is correct.111 This rapid assessment allows for the generation of alerts in real 
time to other poison centers throughout the nation, as well as to health care facilities, 
departments of health, law enforcement, and the general public. Additionally, the data 
collected by NPDS not only provides threat assessment, but it is also useful for tracking 
adverse events around pharmaceutical agents, to provide data in support of public health 
initiatives, as a component of research studies, and for the compilation of an annual 
morbidity and mortality case reports.112  
1. Technology 
NPDS is compatible with four computerized case management systems: 
DotLab,toxiCALL,ToxSentry, and CasePro.113 Each of these systems utilize 
predetermined definitions developed by the AAPCC, each prompts for the same patient 
information, and each interfaces with a commercially developed product information 
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database that provides product specific codes. In addition, each has a compatible interface 
to allow upload of cases to the AAPCC’s national database. The product database 
Poisindex not only provides product codes but also product-specific information and 
management guidelines. Furthermore, it is supported by evidenced based toxicological 
research that is utilized by poison center staff.114 
The AAPCC maintains a list of 1000 generic codes, some of which are linked to 
brand specific codes within Poisindex. There are also those occasions when the AAPCC 
sends a unique code associated with a specific occurrence or specific toxin. For example, 
during the Gulf Oil Spill in 2010, poison centers received and coded over 1000 exposure 
related calls. A unique code was assigned for these calls and this code was disseminated 
to all poison centers. Initially, this code was used for dermal and lung exposures, but then 
it was applied to cases where someone ingested oil-contaminated seafood as well.115  
An example of one of the data collection programs is Toxicall, developed by the 
technology consulting firm Computer Automation Systems. Toxicall is used by the 
majority of the 55 poison centers across the country. Trained poison center staff enter 
patient/case information into the Toxicall database. There are several pre-determined data 
fields that are required for inclusion in NPDS reporting, and some fields that are utilized 
for patient care management at the individual poison center. NPDS required fields 
include species, age, sex, weight, zip codes, clinical symptoms, results from diagnostic 
testing, exposures information including substance, site of exposure, as well a medical 
outcome. Staff access drop down boxes that have a list of 131 symptoms and 72 
treatments.116  
NPDS surveillance is based on call volumes, clinical effects, medical outcomes 
and unique cases. Variances in call volume are noted when a center uploads a larger than 
anticipated number of cases. Each poison center has a pre-determined, baseline hourly 
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call volume, and it is adjusted for normal variations. Call volume changes based on a 
specific zip code or county are also tracked along with surveillance around clinical 
symptoms.117 
Symptoms that are not often seen, such as those from an anthrax exposure, will 
result in a triggering event. The final surveillance indicator is case based. There are 11 
determinants used to track those cases that are of a highly suspicious nature. If a single or 
multiple cases meets the definition, an alert is sent to the originating poison center for 
case confirmation. These 11 triggers include acute radiation syndrome, arsenic, botulism, 
ciguatera, cyanide, nerve agents, paralytic shellfish, puffer fish, radiation injury, ricin, 
and smallpox.118 The process for determining if there is a significant public health threat 
using NPDS data is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Surveillance Algorithm119 
 
Source: Amy F. Wolkin et al., “Using Poison Center Data for National Public Health 
Surveillance,” 60. 
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In addition to providing real-time surveillance, NPDS data is utilized to generate 
weekly, monthly, and annual reports. These reports can be run by individual poison 
centers to include their center specific information or to be inclusive of national data. 
State departments of health have free access to this data and can run reports as needed. 
County departments of health are provided county specific information upon request. 
Data on drug abuse trends are shared regularly with agencies such as DEA, as well as 
local, state and federal policy makers. 
NPDS provides timely tracking of poison exposures and has the capacity to track 
anomalies nationwide, including the early detection of CBRN threats. The collaborative 
efforts around toxicosurveillance between the American Association of Poison Control 
Centers and the CDC provides the ability to share critical information to multiple 
partners, including public health, law enforcement, policy makers, and governmental 
agencies.120 
2. Drug Abuse Trends  
Poison centers are continually tracking new and emerging drug of abuse trends. 
This was the case when synthetic marijuana abuse increased substantially in 2010. This 
drug, widely abused prior to 2010 in Europe, was originally synthesized in a laboratory 
for legitimate medicinal purposes and not for the illicit purposes it is being used for 
now.121 
The magnitude of this trend is evidenced by the NPDS data, which shows that in 
2010 there were over 2500 calls to poison centers regarding synthetic marijuana cases 
and in 2011 there were just shy of 7,000 reported cases.122 During 2013 and 2014, there 
appeared to be a drop in call volumes; however, as of April 2015, it was noted that the 
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number of abuse cases were significant enough to suggest that abuse of this drug is on the 
rise again. The AAPCC reported in April a 330 percent increase in call volume related to 
this drug since January 1. Equally impressive was a review of the data from 2014, which 
showed a 229 percent increase as compared to the same timeframe in 2014.123  
Poison center staff not only detected and reported on this trend, but their clinical 
expertise was solicited by health care providers (HCP) caring for these patients. One 
explanation for the increase in health care facilities calls around these cases was that HCP 
had little knowledge of the toxicity of this drug and the presenting symptoms were 
unusual and not consistent with what they had previous seen with non-synthetic 
marijuana cases.124 
Synthetic marijuana is not the only trend that has been tracked by poison centers. 
During the mid-2000s, there was a growing trend among teens to abuse over the counter 
medication (OTC) including the drug dextromethorphan (DMX). Poison center data has 
included this drug since the early eighties. During the late nineties to the mid-2000, 
several states reported an increase in abuse cases with DMX. The NPDS data reflects 
both generic and brand name of products. One of the most commonly abused brand that 
contains DMX is Coricidinr. In 2006, NPDS showed a decrease in Coricidin abuse but an 
increase in other products containing DMX. This information is useful as it helps 
determine prevention messaging.125  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that use of heroin and other opioids continues to 
escalate in urban, rural, and suburban areas. Legislators and public health officials are 
pursuing and implementing strategies to help combat this crisis but face a major obstacle 
in the lack of shared intelligence and trend analysis. Town hall meetings are occurring 
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across the country with key stakeholders highlighting the impact of drugs abuse trends on 
their communities.126 
3. Consumer Products 
New products come on the market on a daily basis. Some of these new products 
can have dangerous consequences if used inappropriately. This occurred in 2011 when 
several companies introduced a new formulation for laundry detergents in the form of a 
“pod.” This product has been known to cause children who accidentally ingested them to 
become gravely ill. The dangers of this new product were first reported by a poison 
center. The staff of the California Poison Center also began noticing a problem with these 
products when in March of 2012, a flurry of calls was received by its center regarding 
these laundry pods. The frequency of these exposures and the serious clinical effects 
resulting from these exposures prompted the development of a generic code to be used by 
all poison centers when they entered cases for NPDS.127  
To this day, there are ongoing efforts to collect this data. These efforts include 
capturing specific brand names in order to facilitate research evaluating why some brands 
produce more symptoms then others. Also under research is why some children develop 
only mild symptoms as compared to others who develop life-threatening symptoms.128 
The positive outcome of detecting this issue and reporting on it is that some of the 
companies have added warning labels to their products and altered the packaging to 
discourage accidental exposure.129 
                                                 
126 Charles Schumer, “Schumer Calls for First Statewide Heroin Database: Lack of Information 
Hinders NY Law Enforcement’s Ability to Combat Heroin Crisis; Drugstat Will Allow Local Cops, 




127 S. J. Huntington, R. Vohira, Heppner, R. Mallios, and Robert. J. Geller, “Serious Adverse Effects 
from Single Use Detergent Sacs; Report from a U.S. Statewide Poison Control System,” Clinical 
Toxicology 52, no. 3 (2014): 220.   
128 Ibid., 224. 
129 Ibid.  
43 
Other products that have been noted to cause unanticipated toxic effects include 
electronic nicotine delivery devices or e-cigs as they are commonly known. These 
devices, often sweetly flavored, capture the attention of small children, and they have 
contributed to nicotine related toxicity. From 2007 to 2014, there were over 2400 calls to 
poison centers around this product.130  
As new products continue to enter the marketplace, poison center staff will 
continue to stay vigilant. Keeping track of unanticipated clinical effects and increases in 
call volumes around new products allows for the development of prompt warning, 
prevention messaging, and possible removal of the product from the market place. 
B. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The need for biological and chemical surveillance that is accurate, time-sensitive, 
and allows for an actionable response to documented in the literature. The numerous and 
varied methodologies and agencies conducting this type of surveillance validates this and 
provides foundational cause for additional research and the refinement of processes. The 
research also provides supporting evidence of poison center’s role in surveillance. This 
role should be expanded beyond drugs of abuse, carbon monoxide, and other chemicals, 
and biological threats such as influenza and Ebola.  
To date, there is limited published research and cases studies demonstrating the 
efficacy of poison centers’ response to these threats. Prevailing documentation shows that 
poison control centers have the ability to respond to threats in real time and that they have 
collaborative relationships with federal, state, and local public health, law enforcement, 
and health care agencies.  
A CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report published on April 21, 2005 is a 
retrospective review of the data collected by Florida Poison Information Center Network 
during hurricane season from 2003 to 2005. This study reviewed cases of carbon 
monoxide, snake and bee bites, kerosene, propane, explosives, and food poisonings called 
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into the Florida Poison Information Network in 2004 and 2005 post-hurricane landfall. 
This data was compared to control year 2003 when no hurricane occurred. Further 
discussed in this article was the daily reporting by the Florida Poison Information Center 
Network (FPICN) to its state departments of health as well as data sharing for the CDC 
on the Epidemic Exchange Network (EPIX). The information provided on EPIX reached 
health care provides, public health officials, and stakeholders, including policy makers 
across the state of Florida and across the nation. Public health warning, initiatives, and 
actions resulted from the information provided.131 
While the NPDS is fairly robust and intuitive from a technological perspective, 
there are some significant limitations within the data collection process. These include a 
lack of a mandate requiring health care facilities to contact a poison center on all of their 
poison cases; staff subjectivity when entering case information; the need to rapidly create 
or update generic codes when a threat or call surge is noted; and limited or incomplete 
patient information from heath care providers, including history, presenting symptoms, 
and treatments provided.  
Operator and provider subjectivity are directly linked to the quality of the data 
collected and reported. One solution to operator subjectivity is an increase in training on 
a national and local poison center levels. One such training effort is the “Tricky Coding 
Question,” which is a weekly complex scenario sent to all poison center staff looking for 
their input on how they would code if the example provided was a real case. Feedback is 
than provided as to how the case should be coded based on the predetermined and agreed 
upon definitions established by the AAPCC.132 
Two studies were conducted to look at the effectiveness of poison center staff 
coding: Coding of Influenza H1N1 Virus Calls Received by Forrester and Jaramillo and A 
Controlled Evaluation of Case Clinical Effect Coding by Poison Center Specialists for 
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Detection of WMD Scenarios by Beuhler, Whittler, Ford and Dulaney.133 The first study 
looked at cases called into the Texas Poison Center Network from April 20 to September 
30, 2009 regarding H1N1. These cases were reviewed to determine if they were coded 
correctly. Results of the study revealed only a 75 percent accuracy rate and also noted 
that as call volumes decreased accuracy increased.134  
The second study detailed a case-based drill conducted at a single poison center. 
The staff was given case scenarios to code that were related to cyanide and botulism 
poisoning. Accuracy of coding in this study was determined to be dependent on the 
staff’s level of experience with the agents, and if they held a certification in the 
toxicology field.135 This study did not account for the variations in staff training from 
center to center.  
A contributing factor to CSPI coding challenges is the tendency for health care 
providers to provide a limited or incomplete case history and presentation to them. If the 
information documented is limited by the information presented by the healthcare 
provider, appropriate response steps cannot be initiated. Factors influencing what is 
shared include time, perceived relevance, and what information the patient has provided. 
This lack of a complete picture limits what can be documented and produces a cascading 
effect. This effect is a delay in notification to hospital staff and EMS of the threat. In turn, 
this does not allow them to become familiar with the toxin before patients begin to arrive. 
They may have a lack of knowledge of anticipated symptoms, necessary self-protective 
precautions, and standard of care. Ultimately, this will impact the patients as treatment is 
delayed and potentially put the health care providers at risk.  
Other factors contributing to the limited impact poison center surveillance has on 
depicting an accurate assessment of trends is with drug abuse trends. This is evident by 
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the underreporting of patients being treated in heath care facilities (HCFs) for opioid 
overdoses, the lack of a formal mechanism for medical examiners to share death related 
to drug overdoses, and numerous disparate data collection processes. The absence of a 
comprehensive data collection program or formal communication structure has made it 
difficult to demonstrate the need for a comprehensive, well funded, and collaborative 
plan to combat the effects of this ongoing problem.  
Drs. Hernandez and Nelson from the New York City Poison Center and New 
York University (NYU) School of Medicine published a paper suggesting that the under 
appreciation for the scope and depth of the drug abuse problem in New York state is due 
to the absence of unified terminology when collecting data, a lack of documentation 
around whether the drugs were obtained for medical or non-medical uses, and a lack of 
“cause of death collaboration” between poison centers toxicologists and medical 
examiners.136 This finding may be extrapolated to other areas of the county as well. 
Not only is there a lack of sharing of data but there are duplications in effort 
around data collection and the time from collecting the data to publishing the data may be 
lagged up to two years. A study conducted by the Illinois Poison Center looked at opioid 
cases from 2002 through 2007 showing indicators of the impending epidemic involving 
heroin laced with fentanly. These researchers concluded that if a system had be in place 
for trained poison center staff to identify, document, and report these cases there would 
have been a faster community response, fewer deaths, and data published weeks before 
the CDC reported on this crisis.137 This study demonstrates that it is essential that a 
course of action be implemented to close the gap on drug abuse intelligence and improve 
real-time responses. Poison centers are in a position to close this gap.  
One data sharing initiative that involves poison centers is the Researched Abuse, 
Diversion, and Addiction Related Surveillance (RADARS) program. RADARS has 
several “arms” to its study and poison centers are part of one arm. On a weekly basis, 
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cases that meet the inclusion criteria for this study are sent to a central repository for 
RADARS, and this data is analyzed around opioids abuse. Numerous studies are 
published each year, tracking the trends on opioid abuse using poison center data. 
RADARS studies help to drive prevention and awareness campaigns. They also provide 
tangible proof of a systemic problem and help validate supporting agreements when 
presenting a recommendation to policy makers.138 
There are several approaches within the poison center enterprise that would 
address some of these challenges. One recommendation would be to educate health care 
providers on the importance of their toxicosurveillance activities, their partnership with 
the CDC on this initiative, and the large-scale implication. There should be a systematic 
effort to communicate the demonstrated benefits to these healthcare providers to engage 
them more effectively in case consultation. Standardizing the training to of staff across all 
poison centers in best coding practices would also help to ensure a more accurate and 
consistent picture from NPDS.  
A more universal approach to ensure that the data is accurate and timely is with 
the linking of patient’s electronic medical records with poison center’s patient’s database. 
Having access to a patient’s electronic medical record (EMR) would allow for a poison 
center to have a more detailed case history to base management recommendations on, 
have specific exposure information to provide early warning messaging to other partners, 
and it would reduce the time a heath care provider spends on the relaying information to 
the poison center as opposed to providing direct patient care. 
Admittedly, gaining access to each health care facility’s EMR would be difficult. 
Numerous EMR platforms are utilized across the country, and training staff on each 
program would be equally cumbersome, requiring significant commitments of time and 
resources. Additionally, each staff person would need to complete a confidential training 
program for each hospital. A single system or the ability for a “reviewer” to access each 
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system via a single repository or data warehouse would make the data collecting and 
mining more accurate, timely and efficient 
Another consideration in utilizing EMRs to obtain patient history is that it 
minimizes the interaction between the health care provider and the staff of the poison 
center. Media rich theory suggests that face-to-face or direct communication is more 
optimal than indirect communication, such as obtaining information from a database.139 
A question to consider before exploring the widespread access to an EMR is: will this 
reduce the opportunity for collaboration between poison center staff and health care 
providers and will this decrease their utilization of poison centers as a resource? Working 
closely with local responders would help to ensure that this does not happen.  
Once the data is collected, the next challenge is sharing the data. There are 
numerous agencies collecting intelligence but there is limited ability to cross reference 
and validate information. In addition, there are no protocols in place to ensure the quality 
and accuracy of the data collected or of the subsequent actions taken. The development of 
a cohesive nationwide effort to collect this data would be beneficial. Poison centers are in 
a position to take the lead on this effort. To do this, there are several steps and changes 
needed, including mandatory reporting. 
Developing collaboration between poison centers and agencies with the 
Department of Homeland Security would provide another outlet for poison centers data to 
be shared; this may expedite the identification and response to an emerging threat. It 
would be advantageous for DHS to have a partner with close local ties to HCFs, first 
responders, the media, as well as a community presence for the general public.  
Expanding the relationship and initiatives with the CDC and poison centers 
beyond drugs of abuse, carbon monoxide, and other chemicals to biological threats, such 
as influenza and Ebola, would be advantageous as well. It is these types of threats that 
poison centers turn to the CDC for direction in case management, and in turn, poison 
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centers are able to track the new and emerging threats around diseases, drugs, and 
consumer products in real time. 
A recommendation for the state level would be to initiate a comprehensive state 
data collection process around drugs of abuse cases to provide accurate and timely 
intelligence to legislators and policy makers. Networking and building trust at local and 
state levels may influence health care providers to call and report their cases routinely. Of 
course, this is limited to a poison center’s catchment area and does not have national 
impact.  
Each of these recommendations has the potential to increase poison center 
utilization for situational awareness. It is this information that has provided fodder for 
drug abuse legislation on both at state and federal levels, been instrumental in getting 
companies to change their product packaging, and influenced the development of safety 










One of the most important factors in working through a disaster is the ability to 
communicate information that is timely, accurate, and delivered in a focused manner. 
Poison center staffs must be comfortable communicating with professionals from various 
disciplines including, but not limited to, those from nursing and medicine. On a given 
day, they engage in conversation with health care providers within their own host 
institutions as well as from those in their catchment area. Interactions also take place with 
the general public, the media, and each other. Having the ability to communicate clearly, 
accurately, and under duress is a daily challenge. In the following sections, 
communication expectations and challenges are discussed as it relates to these varying 
professions and professionals. 
B. PARTNERS 
Poison center staff manages poisonous exposures in concert with other health care 
and public health professionals. Interoperability and collaboration is essential during an 
emergency so that critical information may be exchanged between all responding 
agencies. The following are examples of those agencies and professionals that poison 
center staff work with during emergency and during normal operations.  
1. Health Care Providers 
A poison center’s staff communicates critical information during emergent 
situations. One interaction that happens with great frequency is that between poison 
centers staff and the staff of health care facilities. As there is no mandated requirement 
for hospital staff to call a poison center, the decision to call a poison center is based on 
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the need for assistance in assessing and treating a patient. The initial interaction between 
poison center staff and hospital staff is usually through the emergency department.140 
There are three scenarios that are common to all poison centers when managing a 
patient in an emergency department, a patient that they are referring into an emergency 
department, or a patient that has been admitted to the hospital. These scenarios include 
the CSPI calling the emergency department (ED) and alerting staff that a patient is 
coming in to be evaluated. Poison Center staff may take a call from a registered nurse, 
physician, or physician extender from a health care facility (HCF) altering them that a 
patient has arrived in their ED and they may be asking for management recommendations 
Poison Center staff also follow up on patients to determine their condition, what 
treatment was received and if additional care recommendations are needed. The follow 
up call may be made to the ED, intensive care unit (ICU), or medical floor.141 
The CSPIs base their management recommendations to HCP or to the person 
calling from home on the information provided to them. They are dependent on the caller 
whether she or he from the general public or from a hospital. This exchange of vital 
information via the telephone requires good communication skills, good assessment 
skills, and the ability to recognize and discern warning signs. CSPIs, like their colleagues 
who work on other nursing triage lines, are impacted by their own experiences, 
judgments, and biases when determining the level of toxicity and severity of outcome of 
their patients.142  
How effectively they perform this task and the ability to extrapolate these results 
to how they would perform during a disaster has been evaluated in several research 
projects. The results were variable. Cummins et al. interviewed staff from a poison center 
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and two major HCFs that were not directly affiliated with the poison center but utilized 
the poison center for case management information. The results from their study showed 
some challenges that needed addressing and had the potential to impact patient outcomes. 
Some of these challenges were the failure of the health care provider to present a clear 
clinical picture to the CSPI that included specific details such as laboratory results or 
clinical symptoms. In some cases, the exchange of clinical information was through a 
third party that had no medical background. On many occasions, the patient was 
discharged, transferred to another facility, or the patient left against medical advisement 
(AMA) prior to the poison center calling and obtaining their medical outcome.143 
Equally problematic is when multiple patients present to an emergency 
department with a similar exposure, as would happen during a disaster, and the CSPI is 
given general information and not patient specific information. The health care provider 
may think it expedient to talk about symptoms and treatment in general terms, and the 
CSPI is then challenged with providing accurate and safe information in light of the fact 
that people react differently to the same exposure based on route, duration, age, and pre-
existing medical conditions.144 
2. EMS 
In a study conducted by Martin-Gil et al., first responders stated that poison 
centers are their first choice as a resource for treatment recommendations for antidotes 
and for decontamination guidelines. The results of this study reinforce the importance of 
maintaining close communication with EMS through training, disaster drills, and 
planning as well as reinforcing the accessibility and credibility of poison center staff. 
Fostering this relationship will increase the likelihood and much-needed, effective, and 
consistent communication during a disaster. Table 1 provides more detailed information 
on what information EMS look for when contacting a poison center.145 
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Table 1.   Reasons for EMS call to a Poison Center146 
Information Requested EMS Response 
Chemical identification 52.6% 
Treatment recommendations 74.1% 
Antidotes 59.5% 
Protective gear 56.9% 
Source: Christian Martin-Gill et al., “Poison Centers As Information Resources For 
Volunteer EMS In A Suspected Chemical Exposure,” The Journal of Emergency 
Medicine 32 (2007): 399. 
3. General Public 
During a disaster, calls come into a poison from the general public. It is the 
responsibility of the CSPI to direct callers to the appropriate level of care, allay some of 
their anxiety, and answer their questions. CSPIs do this as part of their routine work each 
day. Ellington et al. defined four approaches used by CSPI’s when dealing with these 
types of calls. They are “informational, facilitative, planning, and emotional.”147 
The facilitative approach appears to be the most common and involves 
information gathering, with the CSPI asking questions and the caller providing detailed 
information. The next common approach is the informational. During this phase of the 
dialogue, the CSPI is giving information and the caller is asking numerous questions but 
very little detailed information is provided to the CSPI. The next approach is planning. In 
these calls, the CSPI establishes a rapport with the caller while collecting critical 
information and providing guidance. The final and least often demonstrated interaction is 
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Ellington et al. also looked at the determinants for which communicational style is 
employed. Their findings provide some useful information on future communication 
training for CSPIs. During a three to four minute conversation with a caller, 25 percent of 
their interaction is focused on obtaining information, and 25 percent is in the assessment 
and discussion around clinical effects. A smaller percentage of time is spent on building a 
rapport and connecting on an emotional level with the caller, and an equal amount of time 
is spent on making management recommendations.149  
During the types of interactions where there is heighten anxiety and concern, one 
of the most effective ways to ensure that the caller follows the recommendation provided 
is to establish a sense of understanding and trust with the caller. This study suggests that 
individual CSPIs are predisposed to an approach based on their communication style. 
Some CSPIs are more comfortable and able to adjust their style based on the approach 
and needs of the caller. The ideal approach as reported by Ellington et al. is the planning 
approach in combination with the facilitative approach. With both of these approaches, 
there is an opportunity for relationship building while directing optimal care.150 
How to measure poison center utilization or lack of utilization has been an 
ongoing problem faced by poison centers since the inaugural center was established. For 
many years, penetrance or the number human exposure calls received by the poison 
center per population of a given county in that center’s catchment area was a major 
criterion in determining if a poison center should be accredited.151 Poison center staff 
members have taken a critical look at the value of penetrance in light of the confounding 
factors that influence this calculation. These factors include proximity of the center to the 
county being evaluated, population mix of children verses adults, and degree of education 
outreach per county.  
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Litovitz et al. looked at case data entered into NPDS and calculated penetrance 
per call center’s catchment area. The research showed that there were geographical 
variations, as well as those of race, income, educational level, language and how far the 
area was from the poison center that impacted utilization. Areas with high penetrance had 
a high population of children, overall greater population base, Asian Americans living in 
the area, residents with high income and educational background, and a strong poison 
prevention outreach program.152 
These finding were validated in subsequent studies as well. A survey was 
conducted from November 15 to December 7, 2011, to determine how aware callers were 
of the toll free number and services provided by a poison center. Callers where randomly 
selected and included individuals 18 years of age and older. Of the respondents, 41 
percent used cell phones as their primary phone while five percent had landlines.  
A similar survey was conducted in 2006 and some of the results were 
compared.153 In the 2011 survey, there were 2,000 participants. Of the participants, 1,363 
identified themselves a white, 233 as African Americans, 280 as Hispanics, and 127 as 
other. A little more than half were women. The largest age cohort was 45–64 years of 
age, and the smallest was 18–24 years of age. A little more than half had some college or 
more education, and the remaining respondents had high school or less education. A 
summary of the questions in this survey include: 
• Had they contacted a poison center during the previous year? 
• Given a set of scenarios would they call a poison center? 
• Do they know the poison center number? 
The results of the study indicated that there is a need for additional awareness 
education for some high-risk populations, and this can be extrapolated to include disaster 
scenarios as well. Those individuals who identified themselves as white, those 
individuals with children in the household, or those individuals between the ages of 25 
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and 44 were the most knowledgeable of the Poison Help Campaign. Over 70 percent of 
the respondents knew that poison centers are available 24/7, that there is no utilization 
cost, and that language lines are available. The majority of the callers were unaware that 
this was a confidential service. Some thought that social service agencies, police, and 
insurance companies were privy to caller information.154 
In the case of a poison emergency, most respondents stated that they would 
contact 911 but for general information they would call a poison center. A significant 
finding was that respondents over 65 were not aware of poison centers capabilities as 
compared to those who had children under the age of five. It is this last group that stated 
they would be more likely to contact a poison center.155 
A smaller study was conducted within the state of Arizona to evaluate the 
differences between poison center utilization in rural areas as compared to cities. This 
study queried respondents that were 18 years old and over regarding their knowledge of 
poison centers. Results of this survey showed that women who did not identify as black 
or Hispanic and who had children had greater knowledge of poison centers as compared 
to African American and those people who selected Spanish as their primary language, 
regardless of gender, who were least likely to call a poison center.156 These findings 
suggest that race and spoken language may be significant factors is poison center 
utilization.157 
There are many contributory factors for the lack of utilization of poison centers 
among African Americans and Latinos. They include language barrier, fear of 
retribution—including reporting to the department of social services—and distrust of 
perceived government agencies. Kelly et al. developed an educational tool in the form of 
a video that they presented to a group of Spanish speaking mothers at a Women Infants 
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and Children (WIC) clinic. They provided no additional education but did give each 
participant information packets that included the poison center’s toll free number. After 
the viewing of the video, there was increased interest in poison centers.  
This lent itself to the next study, which incorporated the video and poison 
prevention education into 60 parenting education classes for parents who were 
economically challenged and for whom English was not their first language.158 Attendees 
were surveyed prior to the class and then within a month after the class. The results of 
this study showed improvement in poison center awareness, ability to provide poison 
center phone number, and appreciation that some poisonings are safely managed at home 
with poison center staff assistance.159  
Each of these studies has implications for disaster response efforts. Much of what 
these studies revealed was that populations with challenges such as language or people 
who are new to a community are the least likely to reach out to a poison center for help. 
This is concerning during times when efforts are made to reduce unnecessary emergency 
department visits to minimize the spread of a disease, when resources are limited and 
need to be conserved, and when post-disaster travel is restricted due to a state of 
emergency.  
4. Media 
Poison center staff work with the media on a daily basis in a role that is similar to 
that of a public health information officer. This is applicable during a disaster as well. 
They need to get the information out to the public regarding emerging trends and 
immediate issues of concerns. Forming strong collaborative relationships with the media 
has numerous positive benefits. This was a recommendation from a panel of 26 
professionals from emergency management, communications, and public health who 
convened to discuss the role of a PHI and the media during a disaster. Other 
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recommendations from this group included honing communication skills between both 
professionals and inviting representatives from the media to participate in drills.160 
In acknowledgment of the power of the media, HRSA’s Poison Help Line 
initiatives relies heavily on the media to provide ongoing message regarding poison 
center’s scope of function, accessibility, and its national toll free phone number.161 In 
HRSA’s 2012 report to Congress, HRSA illustrated several media-focused initiatives, 
including the development two national public service announcements (PSA), eight radio 
PSAs in English and Spanish, and eight news articles in both languages. In addition to 
these efforts, HRSA also launched two websites: www.PoisonHelp.hrsa.gov and 
www.PoisonHelpEspanol.hrsa.gov. 
The influence of media has been considered in light of a disaster as well. For 
instance, LoVecchio researched the impact the media had on poison center calls after 
September 11, 2001, specific to the month prior to September 11, 2001 and querying for 
anthrax as the exposure. As predicted, no calls had been received by the poison center 
regarding anthrax during that timeframe. LoVecchio then queried for anthrax after 
September 11 and found one call in September, 201 in October, 79 in November, and 10 
in December. The calls increased after the anthrax fatality was reported on October 6, 
2001.162  
The study of Kittler et al. looked at the responses from a survey conducted in 
2001 of 500 patients from an ambulatory clinic in Boston. The study showed that of the 
209 participants, over 75 percent obtained information regarding anthrax from the media. 
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However, these same respondents rank media third as a reliable source as compared to 
their own physicians and Internet sources respectively.163  
Poison centers need to take in to consideration the power of social media. There 
are well-documented examples of how social media has positively impacted the general 
public as well as community responders.164 One example is in 2004 when public health 
professionals utilized Twitter to direct people on where they should go to receive the 
H1N1 vaccination. Some staff went as far as to text pictures during events to reveal 
locations and document activities.165 
5. Colleagues  
Poison centers appear to have good communication skills when working with 
customers and stakeholders. Crouch et al. conducted a study accessing how well poison 
center staff communicate with each other work. In this study, 537 poison center staff 
from centers nationwide were administered a series of survey questions asking them to 
rank how important collegial communication was to them as it relates to a positive work 
environment. They were also asked if communications within the center were distracting, 
what those distractions where, and if it impacted performance. Participants in this study 
were comprised of a multidisciplinary array of staff including CSPI’s, managing 
directors, medical directors, and educators. Results revealed that the majority of the 
respondents ranked collegial communications as very important. An interesting finding 
was that while the majority of the CSPIs did not find communications distracting, 42 
percent ranked them as distracting on a moderate or greater level.166 The types of 
distractions noted were high noise level due to space limitations, cell phones and loud 
voices, and ineffective and critical dialogue among co-workers. Participants also noted 
                                                 
163 Anne F. Kittler et al., “The Internet as a Vehicle to Communicate Health Information During a 
Public Health Emergency: A Survey Analysis Involving the Anthrax Scare of 2001,” Journal of Medical 
Internet Research 6, no. 1 (2004): 4–6.   
164 Raina M. Merchant, Stacy Elmer, and Nicole Lurie, “Integrating Social Media into Emergency-
Preparedness Efforts,” New England Journal of Medicine 365, no. 4 (2011): 291.  
165 Ibid., 290.  
166 B. I. Crouch et al., “The Importance of Interpersonal Communication in Poison Centers,” Clinical 
Toxicology 51, no. 9 (2013): 893–94, DOI: 10.3109/15563650.2013.841913.  
61 
ineffective communication between CSPI and administrative staff and difficult callers as 
a distraction.167 
C. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The majority of Americans witnessed the horrors of 9/11 on their televisions; 
survivors of disasters like hurricanes obtain updated information from radio and 
television that come from worldwide reports that keep all of us informed of earthquakes, 
bombings and the like.168 The impact that media had on individual behavior was 
described in Boston study found in Section B 4, Media, discussed earlier. This study and 
anecdotal evidence confirms that it is essential for poison centers to use the power and 
influence of the media to ensure that complete and accurate information is provided to the 
public during a disaster.  
Relying on past collaborations, the poison centers staff should be accessible as a 
resource for the media. They should provide them with the information and talking points 
in order to allay the public’s fear and reduce inaccuracies and sensationalism. Efforts to 
enhance communication would optimize poison center effectiveness. Their established 
relationship with the staff of departments of health, healthcare facilities, emergency 
medical personnel, as well as the media will help to facilitate productive communication 
during acrisis situation and enhance interoperability during a crisis and normal 
operations.169  
Widening the communication channels to include federal partners would have the 
potential to enhance communication, but poison centers’ communication capabilities 
appears more valuable on a local level. HCPs are more apt to follow recommendations 
from a poison center is they have a trusted relationship with their local toxicologist and 
poison center staff.  
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Disaster response happens first and, hopefully, effectively on a local level. The 
potential to impact high-risk population is more likely to happen by building trust in 
communities prior to a disaster occurring. Preexisting relationships, such as those with 
the media and HCP, are nurtured on an ongoing basis this helps to facilitate 
communication during a disaster. 
There are clear examples of challenges as well. Some populations were found to 
be reticent in using poison center services. This was especially problematic in high-risk 
neighbors and with high-risk populations during a disaster. Expanding the current 
partnership between poison centers HRSA and the Center for Disease Control should be a 
priority. HRSA’s awareness and educational efforts around the creation and promotion of 
the 1-800-222-1222 phone line has increased poison centers’ visibility. The public 
service announcements, previously described in Chapter IV, Section 4, Media, 
demonstrate a commitment to promoting poison centers and ensuing accessibility to all.  
Expanding the current relationships with the CDC and HRSA provides additional 
opportunities for poison centers to provide clinical expertise and situational awareness to 
those entities in the community that look to the CDC for guidance around medical 
emergencies, including HCPs, public health officials, and the general public.  
Building on HRSA’s Poison Helpline ensures that the general public has the 
poison center’s helpline number available and understands that poison centers are viable 
resource during a disaster. There needs to be additional awareness efforts pertaining to 
this messaging. These efforts need to be especially focused on high-risk populations that 
have no knowledge or limited knowledge of poison centers. Poison centers’ capability to 
respond to callers with a hearing or language challenges needs to be included in all 
awareness campaigns.  
Inter-collegial communication needs to be addressed as well. Concerns raised 
from Crouch’s study, as discussed in Section B 5, Colleagues, such as noise level and 
distractions in the workspace, will only increase during call surges associated with a 
disaster. Use of remote staffing will reduce the number of people in the office as well as 
call sharing from one center to another.  
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Collegial communication between poison centers also needs to be considered. 
Poison centers have a long history of sharing information and data from center to center. 
This was evident with the emergence of “bath salts” and the laundry pods as described in 
the Chapter III, Surveillance. Poison center staff became alerted to these issues when the 
managing and medical directors from the poison center that first recognized the problems 
and emailed their colleagues to share this information.170 It was due to their clinical 
expertise that they were able to recognize a problem and then communicate it to their 
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V. CLINICAL EXPERTISE 
A. OVERVIEW  
Poison center staff members have a unique expertise, and an ability to share this 
knowledge 24/7. All recommendations made are evidenced based. Staff not only triage 
incoming calls but they provide ongoing follow-up consultation on those patients treated 
in a hospital.  
B. STAFF 
Poison Center are staffed with professionals from various clinical and educational 
backgrounds. Each specialty brings their own unique expertise to a center and provides 
for a multi-layered approach to managing and preventing poisonings. A more detailed 
explanation of the different types of staff and their clinical expertise is provided in the 
following section.    
1. CSPIs  
CSPI’s are on the “frontline” of poison centers. They provide triage, case 
management, and follow-up support of non-toxic to highly toxic exposures each day. 
Their clinical expertise may vary based on their educational background, their poison 
center training and years of experience.171 CSPIs must quickly assess a patient’s 
symptoms over the phone, provide clear directions to non-health care providers for home 
based calls and evidenced based recommendations to health care providers.172 They 
always have as a back-up resource a medical or clinical toxicologist to review cases with 
to help them make management recommendations particularly for hospital based 
cases.173 
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2. Toxicologists 
A paper written by members of the AAPCC Taskforce from September 2010 
describes the role of a poison center’s clinical toxicologists as that of a “virtual 
toxicologist” for the health care providers calling for a consultation regarding their 
poisoned patient. Physicians and physician extenders, particularly in rural areas, depend 
on the expertise and resources provided to them by poison centers.174 This level of 
knowledge can be valuable during times of crisis and when getting accurate medial 
information is time sensitive. 
There is documented evidence that the clinical expertise of the poison center staff 
impacted patient outcomes and impacts utilization of health care resources. For example, 
the clinical knowledge of a toxicologist would prove useful during a nuclear power plant 
emergency. They would not only be able to provide management guidelines on radiation 
exposures but would also be able to develop educational material for both the public and 
for health care providers.175 
Poison center staff are always looking for opportunities for continuing education 
and collaboration. The CDC hosted a round table exercise in Atlanta Georgia to evaluate 
and educate poison center staff on how to respond during a radiation emergency. A 
general email was sent out across the AAPCC membership inviting staff to participate. 
There were 36 attendees including medical toxicologists, clinical toxicologists, and 
CSPIs.176 
This exercise provided an opportunity to discuss what the role poison centers play 
during such an emergency and what challenges might hinder their efforts. Attendees 
proposed they would play a key role in case management, serving as a point of 
information distribution, as well as data collection. They also expressed concerns about 
their limited knowledge and experience in radiation emergencies and said they would 
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require additional training as well as management guidelines in order to feel better 
prepared to respond to this type of emergency. A suggestion that came of this exercise 
was that poison centers need to increase their collaboration on a state and federal levels, 
including agencies such as Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site 
(REAC/TS)177 and radiation programs.  
C. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Poison center staff not only detected and reported on the emerging trends but also 
provided lifesaving medical recommendations. This was shown with the emerging 
synthetic marijuana trend, not only was data sought to substantiate the growing concern, 
but their clinical expertise was solicited by health care providers caring for these patients. 
One explanation for the increase in health care facilities calling for management 
recommendations for these cases may be that the presentations were more intense that 
what was expected with cannabis and that the HCP had little or knowledge of the toxicity 
of this drug.178 
How effectively a CSPI manages a poisoning may be predicated on their level of 
experience with a given agent. Poynton et al. conducted a study at a large U.S. poison 
center examining how CSPI’s predict patient outcome as compared to the actual patient 
outcome. This study was conducted over a period of 13 months and included input from 
13 CSPIs with varying backgrounds, including pharmacists and registered nurses. The 
results confirmed previous studies that demonstrated a tendency to predict accurate 
outcomes when the nature of the exposures produced mild symposiums as compared to a 
decrease in ability to accurately predict outcomes from more serious exposure cases.179 
The reason behind these results may be related to CSPI experience and frequency in 
dealing with calls of low toxicity as compared to those of high toxicity. This may be 
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problematic during a disaster, when the CSPIS are faced with an unusual, unfamiliar, and 
high toxic substance.180 
An example where the utilization of poison center’s staff’s expertise would have 
positively impacted outcome was in a study conducted by the Illinois Poison Center. The 
researchers from this center looked at opioid cases from 2002 through 2007, which 
showed indicators of the impending epidemic involving heroin laced with fentanly. These 
researchers concluded that if a system had been in place for trained poison center staff to 
identify, document, and report these cases, then there would have been a faster 
community response, fewer deaths, and published data weeks before the CDC report on 
this crisis.181  
Poison centers need to be involved consistently around public health concerns 
such as the growing drug abuse trend. Collaborating within a national platform will help 
increase their visibility. For example, a more integrated relationship with emergency 
management would only enhance the relationship with poison center and strengthen their 
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VI. REDUCING THE BURDEN ON HEALTHCARE FACILITIES  
A. OVERVIEW 
The primary mission of poison centers is to “decrease the morbidity, mortality 
and cost related to poisonings.”182 To do this, poison centers use multifaceted approach 
that includes the engagement of competent staff, 24/7 triage services, poison prevention 
initiatives, collaboration with other agencies, and focused efforts to eliminate 
unnecessary health care utilization.  
B. HEALTH CARE COSTS 
A study conducted by the Lewin Group suggests that poison centers realize a cost 
savings by reducing unnecessary emergency room visits and patients’ length of stay. The 
results were calculated and demonstrated 1.8 billion dollars in savings or a return on 
investments of $13 per dollar invested in poison centers.183 Table 2 provides a detailed 
breakdown of annually cost savings attributed to poison center utilization for a poisoning.  
Table 2.   Health Care Cost Savings per Year Based on Utilization184  
Cost Savings (in millions) Reason 
$753 Unnecessary health care visits 
$441 Prevention outreach 
$23 Decreases length of stay 
$603 Days out of work 
Adapted from: The Lewin Group, Final Report on the Value of the Poison Center System, ii. 
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CDC’s 2010 fatality report indicated that over 40,000 drug related deaths 
occurred inclusive of poisonings and drug abuse causes.185 In addition, Friedman et al. 
looked at the role poison center consultation from health care facility staff impacted 
patient outcomes and their length of stay relative to a poison exposure. Their study 
reviewed 9,936 hospitalizations across 186 hospitals in the Illinois poison center’s 
catchment area.  
Friedman et al. conducted a comparative analysis looking at two groups with the 
same diagnoses of suicide attempts using a single drug or combination of drugs and non-
drug products. The authors compared the medical outcome between those cases in which 
a poison center was consulted for management recommendations and those that did not. 
The researchers limited the study to inpatients in a health care facility that also had an 
emergency department as their entry point for admissions. The International 
Classification of Disease codes (ICD) were utilized to determine diagnosis.186  
The results showed 0.5-day decrease in length of stay (LOS) for those cases 
where a poison center was consulted and an overall reduction in health care costs based 
on a longitudinal analysis of all patients admitted with that diagnosis. LOS was adjusted 
down from 1.5 days to the reported 0.5 days based on several factors, including that 
patients in the consultation group were younger and had less co-morbidities than those in 
the group that did not receive a consultation.187 
A 2008 article published by LoVechio et al. similarly demonstrates cost savings 
after consultation with a poison center, but this study looks at home rather than a health 
care facility as site of caller. In this study, staff from a poison center conducted a survey 
from February 1 to April 1 of 2007 asking callers what they would have done in the event 
there had been no poison center to contact for their poison exposure. A total of 600 
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responses were solicited with 37 percent indicating they would have called for an 
ambulance, and 33 percent would have gone directly to an emergency department by 
private vehicle. Only those callers that had exposures that did not require referral into a 
health care facility were excluded from this survey. The authors posit that 70 percent of 
the callers would have been treated in an emergency department. They extrapolated these 
results to the 41,262 human exposure calls that the poison center received in 2007 and 
calculated that there would have been 28,883 patients that sought medical treatment in a 
hospital unnecessarily. They then look at the average cost for these 28,883 patients and 
determined that $33,270,000 in health care cost was saved by their poison center.188 
There have been numerous studies conducted over the last five years looking at 
the cost effectiveness of poison centers. Galvao and Silva reviewed over 422 such studies 
from June 2010 to November of 2011. They determined from the 422 studies, only nine 
met their inclusion criteria. Of these nine studies, seven focused on U.S. poison centers 
and each one demonstrated cost savings attributed to poison center consultation. The cost 
savings ranged from 0.76 to 36 dollars saved as compared to every dollar expended on 
poison centers.189 In addition the study by LoVeccchio et al. described in the previous 
paragraph, demonstrates the highest rate of cost saving at $36 saved.190 
Each of these studies has implications as health care cost continues to escalate. A 
past president of the AAPCC, Marsha Ford, addressed the Subcommittee on Health of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce regarding the monies spent on unnecessary 
medical expenses. She stated that in 2009, the amount was in excess of 200 billion 
dollars.191 This number will not only escalate over time with raising health care costs but 
will increase during times of disasters as well.  
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C. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are benefits to minimizing the burden of unnecessary emergency 
department visits during a disaster and during normal operation that have been 
demonstrated by numerous studies quantifying the cost savings. An example was 
presented in Chapter II, Section B 2, Intentional Biological and Chemical Exposures. 
Poison centers where able to respond to and allay the public fears around anthrax 
poisoning and thereby reduce the number of people that would have sought unnecessary 
medical care in an emergency department.  
This was also the case with the West Virginia case study, presented in Chapter II, 
where the poison center handle over 700 calls related to the Freedom Industries chemical 
spill. By providing triage support to these callers over the phone, the poison center 
reduced calls and visits to the local health care facilities and health care providers. 
Additional supporting evidence was provided in the Lewin Group’s published report in 
2012, which not only demonstrates cost savings for unnecessary ED visits, hospital 
admissions, LOS but also days of work. A summary was provided in Table 2.  
In addition to evaluating cost savings with the use of poison centers is an attempt 
to evaluate their effectiveness of service quantitatively. The prevailing tool used to 
measure the effectiveness of a poison center’s service, as discussed in Chapter IV, 
Section 3, General Public, is calculating the penetrance for each county served. 
Penetrance is calculated based on the population of an area and the number of exposure 
calls received from that area adjusted for 1,000. The lower the penetrance the fewer 
number of calls has been received by that area, and conversely, the higher the penetrance, 
the greater number of calls received. This calculation has been included in the 
accreditation process as a determinant of how successful a poison center is in reaching its 
constituents. It is also used when strategizing poison center’s outreach educational 
efforts. This approach does have some limitations however as a larger number may be 
reflective of more focused prevention efforts in that area and a smaller number may be 
due to a smaller pediatric population in that county.192 
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When a disaster occurs, FEMA responds and facilitates the dissemination of 
resources, and partnering with poison centers would impact the distribution of necessary 
versus unnecessary medical supplies, such as antidotes. Poison centers would have the 
capabilities to perform triage, consult on anticipated severity of symptoms, and long-term 
prognostic indicators. One example is with carbon exposure after Hurricane Sandy. 
Poison center clinical staff would have been able to assessment on the need for exposed 
patient to receive hyperbaric treatment. 
The current relationship with HRSA and the CDC has impacted penetrance 
through the extensive marketing and advertizing of the national 800-222-1222 poison 
helpline number. Further expansion of these efforts to include promotion within the 
healthcare community would increase awareness and potential utilization by healthcare 
providers. 
Having a strong collaborative relationship within the poison catchment area 
includes 911 centers and first responders. When a caller calls 911, and the 911 dispatcher 
consults with a poison center before dispatching a rig, it results in fewer transports to an 
emergency department. Likewise, when a first responder calls from the scene, the call 
may result in the patient remaining at home if the poison center staff determines that the 
exposure is non-toxic. As demonstrated in the LoVeecho study there are cost savings that 
result from poison center’s intervention in reducing unnecessary medical interventions.  
Another benefit from EMS calling from the scene is that if the patient does need 
to be transported to a HCF,  poison staff is able to provide initial recommendations to 
them as well as the opportunity to gather from them, pertinent patient information to 
provide the receiving HCF. The poison center staff are then able to contact the HCF staff 





Greater utilization of poison centers by 911, physicians, and first responders 
would directly impact when and how a patient is transported to a hospital as well as their 
course of treatment and stay. This is applicable during a disaster by providing the phone 
triage service as well as with toxicology case consultations, thus decreasing the number 
of unnecessary patient transports.  
The CDC has led an effort around bring together poison center staff, members 
from the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, and state health department 
representatives in the formation of the Poison Center and Public Health Collaborations 
Community of Practice (CoP). This committee convenes in order to share ideas around 
public health related issues, discuss initiatives, opportunities for partnering, and vet ideas 
around poison center’s role in response to public health threats.193 
There are numerous other federal and state agencies that have a focus on 
poisonings. Some of these agencies have partnered with poison centers. Table 3 
illustrates how diverse and vast the efforts are. This is only a sampling of multiple 
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Table 3.   Agencies that Deal with Poisonings 
Examples of Exposures Responding Agencies 
Pediatric and Adults Consumer Products 
and Medications 
Center for Disease Control 
Consumer Product Safety Commission 
Safe Kids 
Food and Drug Safety Federal Drug Administration 
Department of Agriculture 
Drugs of Abuse State’s Departments of Health, 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Drug Enforcement Agency 
Environmental toxins Environmental Protection Agency 
Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease 
Registry 
 
Occupational exposures Occupation Safety and Health Administrations 
Terrorism and Disasters Department of Homeland Security 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Center for Disease Control 
Adapted from: Institute of Medicine Committee, Forging a Poison Prevention and 
Control System, 285. 
Each of these agencies and others could benefit from the data and expertise of 
poison centers staff. Expanding and including poison centers in their efforts would 
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VII. IMPROVING OUTCOMES DURING A DISASTER BY 
LEVERAGING POISON CENTER’S CAPABILITIES  
Research, case studies, and analysis of efforts demonstrated that poison centers 
provide a service to the public and professional community during times of normal 
operations and during a disaster. The previous chapters described what poison centers do 
well and where there are opportunities for improvement.  
Despite of all of the efforts spanning a 50-plus year history, as stated in the IOM 
publication Forging a Poison Prevention and Control System, “poison centers are in the 
room but not at the table.”195 This is shortsighted as poison centers, as described in this 
paper, do positively impact outcomes during a disaster. They do not generate income, but 
they do save lives, reduce health care costs, and provide a unique and valuable resource 
to the public and professional community. 
One explanation for their lack of presence at the “table” may be that even though 
there have long-standing attempts to solidify poison centers into a cohesive organization, 
there continues to be some disparate efforts among poison centers. Part of the reason may 
lie in the fact that there are different expectations by stakeholders and funders from 
poison center to poison center. Equally plausible is that poison centers are continually 
faced with budgetary concerns. Maintaining operations when funding is a challenge and 
shifts the focus from “how to collaborate” to “how to survive.”  
Efforts to expand poison centers’ scope of function to increase utilization and 
stabilize funding has been impacted by staffing shortages, differences in staff training, 
differences in capabilities and lack of time. Some centers are more reticent to engage in 
activities that, at first glance, seem outside of the scope of toxicology then others. These 
difference manifest in a variety of ways and include: overall level of comfort in dealing 
with certain disaster, variations in how cases are coded and importance of coding, 
willingness to engage in partnerships, and forging partnerships on the local, state, and 
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federal levels. In addition, the lack of a universally agreed upon shared matrix for poison 
center unitization or health care cost savings has yet to be determined.  
To more effectively contribute to disaster response, poison centers must promote 
what they have done and can do in a disaster. The American Association of Poison 
Control Centers and individual centers themselves need to partner with relevant 
homeland security and other officials to develop a strategic plan to fully utilize poison 
centers’ capabilities in public emergencies. These strategies should include: (1) the 
expansion of collaborations with nontraditional partners including those outside of 
healthcare; (2) the provision of surveillance around all chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosives (CBRN) threats; and (3) the active engagement in disaster 
response and planning efforts 
For there to be an impactful change to how poison center’s capabilities are 
integrated into disaster response efforts at the local, state, and national levels during a 
disaster, these strategizes need to be adopted by all poison centers within the AAPCC 
membership. Some tactile first steps towards meeting this vision, based on this research, 












Table 4.   Recommendations Summary 
Capabilities Recommendations 
Ability to response during 
emergencies-disaster  
1. Develop formal relationship with FEMA and 
other DHS agencies 
2. Engage on a local and state level on planning 
committees and drills. 
Toxicosurveillance 1. Statewide regulation requiring that health care 
facilities contact their local poison center for all 
poisoning cases. 
2. Begin discussion around poison centers gaining 
access to their hospitals electronic medical 
records. 
3. Development of a state or nationally based 
repository for all drug abuse cases. 
Accessibility and communication 
infrastructure 
3. Expand partnership with CDC to include other 
public health threats  
4. Expand on HRSA’s Poison Helpline Campaign 
to for the general public to increase their 
utilization of poison centers 
Ability to reduce unnecessary 
health care costs 
1. Initiate a national awareness campaign directed 
at health care providers and other public health 
professional around the scope and function of 
poison centers. 
 
Clinical expertise to impact patient 
outcomes 
1. Standardize CSPI Training. 
2. Include poison centers in statewide disaster 
planning and drills. 
3. Encourage poison center staff to attend FEMA 
training opportunities. 
4. Increase in the research efforts and publishing 






Developing a more formal and collaborative relationship within the Department 
of Homeland Security, increasing the partnerships with HRSA, the CDC, and increasing 
poison centers presences at the local, state, and national levels, will only strength the five 
core poisons center functions during a disaster. 
Maintaining the relationship with HRSA and the ongoing promotion of the Poison 
Helpline will continue to increase awareness of poison centers capabilities. Efforts to 
expand this campaign to include target audiences such as law enforcement, emergency 
medical services, and public health professionals should be considered as well.  
Building on the current relationship with the CDC around toxicosurveillance 
should continue to be a priority for poison centers as more agencies recognize the 
situational awareness function provided by the poison centers, the greater likelihood of 
utilizing this service as well as the other services they provide. Part of expanding this 
relationship should include surveillance and support, not just with pandemic flu and 
Ebola, but other public health concerns too. Exploration of these opportunities through 
the CoP initiative would allow for ongoing dialog around poison centers role in public 
health.  
Disaster response would be greatly enhanced by collaborating with FEMA and 
other DHS departments. These partnerships would add visibility, creditability, and a 
national platform for poison centers; however, the impact of local and state planning and 
response cannot be overlooked. The initial and often most impactful response happen on 
this level. Early engagement with poison centers will enhance response efforts and 
mitigate some of the effects. 
Our nation is confronted by threats that are manmade or natural on a daily basis. 
We need to stay vigilant in order to plan for, detect, respond to, and mitigate the effects 
of these threats. Poison centers to this on a daily basis. It is in the best interest of our 
communities to leverage the demonstrated expertise of our poison centers to enhance 
existing disaster response efforts. We need to do this to better safeguard the well being of 
all of us. 
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